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CHAPTER 1
CHANGING THEORIES OF ROYAL AUTHORITY, LAW,
AND GOVERNMENT
A. Theories of Law and Kingship
Until the era of King Rama V, the Thai conceptions of
law and of kingship were interrelated to an extraordinary
degree. The predominant position of the king as creature,
creator, and protector of the legal system was a concept
which persisted into the middle of King Chulalongkorn's reign
when it, like many other traditional assumptions, was
challenged and to some extent reshaped by revisionist thought.
Despite the broad sweep of reform under King Chulalongkorn,
however, many of the traditional ideas and practices were
retained. If any monarch wielded absolute power or played
the ancient role of paternalistic and benevolent ruler, surely
it was King Chulalongkorn at the height of his reign. And yet,
during this very apotheosis of absolute rule, ideas crept in,
were tolerated, were even encouraged and promoted by the
ruler himself, which challenged the centrality of the king to
the Thai legal system. In a curious way, the very transform-
ation of Thai law which measured the height of absolute power
also marked the beginning of a separation of the two concepts
of law and kingship, a process which would ultimately lead to
the termination of the absolute monarchy in June 1932.
The unusual historical predominance of the traditional
Thai king, both legally and politically, derived not from a
single conception of law and kingship, but from a synthesis
of several different and sometimes contradictory conceptions
which entered Thai society over the course of several centuries.
Perhaps the earliest form of kingship was the patriarchal
monarchy of which there is evidence dating from the kingdom of
Sukhothai in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. This
earlier theory was cast in familial terms, with the monarch
ruling his small but independent kingdom like a wise and
benevolent father. The king was not yet the distant, semi-
divine figure which he was to become. In theory and in
legend he was accessible to the people and ready to aid in the
settlement of disputes among members of his "family":
In the gateway of the palace a bell is hung;
if anyone in the kingdom has some grievance
or some matter that is ulcerating his entrails
and troubling his mind, and wishes to lay it
before the king, the way is easy: he has
only to strike the bell hung there. Every
time King Rama Khamheng hears this appeal, he
interrogates the plaintiff about the matter
and gives an entirely impartial decision.
Subsequent conceptions of Thai kingship were more
explicitly Indian in origin, entering Thai society by way of
the Khmer empire on the one hand and the Mon people on the
other. The Khmer influence, increasingly apparent in the
development of the kingdom of Ayutthaya, made of the king a
more distant and stern figure, identified in theory with the
Hindu gods Shiva and Vishnu, surrounded therefore with Hindu
ritual, advised in the mysteries of the sacred law by his own
Brahmin legal experts, and bearing towards the people the
relationship of master to servant rather than father to
child. This was the concept of king as Devaraja, the awe-
inspiring and god-like figure who so impressed European
visitors to the Thai court in the seventeenth century. 3 This
form of kingship led to the characterization of the Thai
monarch as chao chiwit,or "Lord of Life," with a theoretically
absolute power of life and death over his subjects.
The stern and forbidding image of the king as Devaraja
mingled to some extent with Buddhist conceptions of kingship
which came to Thai society through the influence of the Mons.
The Mon people of southern Thailand and Burma, strongly
influenced by Theravada Buddhism, had transformed many of the
Hindu precepts of law and kingship into a less forbidding theory
of royal authority. 4 it was probably from them that the Thai
concept of king as idealized ruler was drawn. According to
this theory the king was to promote the teachings of the Buddha
and to conform his own behavior to the ethical principles which
the Buddha had articulated. The Devaraja conception in
Thailand was thus reformulated in a most significant way
during the Ayutthaya period:
The Brahmanical concept of the Devaraja, the
king as god, was modified to make the king the
embodiment of the Law, while the reign of
Buddhist moral principles ensured that he
should be measured against the Law. The effect
of this transformation was to strengthen the
checks which, in the Khmer empire, Brahmans
had attempted to exercise against despotic
excesses of absolute rule. 5
Central to the king's function as upholder of the sacred
law was the Thai thammasat, a form of legal code derived from
the Hindu dharma-Sastras as restated by Mon legal specialists.
The thammasat set forth the history of the world and man, the
evolution of laws, and the origin of kings. It defined the
relationship between the individual and the state and prescribed
the norms by which the ruler should be governed in his actions.
It contained legal precepts by which the relations between
people were to be regulated, together with certain inter-
pretations which those precepts had inspired through the years.
T ^ e thammasat was, in short, the fundamental statement of
royal law and legitimacy in traditional Thailand.
The centrality of the thammasat to the Thai system of
law and kingship was reaffirmed by King Chulalongkornfs
ancestor, the founder of the Chakkri dynasty. In the first
years of the Bangkok period the law of the previous Ayutthaya
period had been used in the new capital. It is said, however,
that King Rama I ordered a thorough revision and purification
of this traditional body of law after a famous lawsuit came
before him in 1804 on a petition for his final judgement. A
woman known as Amdaeng P<?m sought to divorce her husband,
Nai Bunsri, who resisted her suit and alleged on appeal that
she herself had been guilty of adultery with one of the judges.
King Rama I determined that the divorce had properly been
granted under the law as it then existed, but he believed it
unfair to allow a woman to obtain a favorable decree whenever
she requested a divorce, without any inquiry into allegations of
misconduct on her part. 6 Believing that the provision requiring
such a result was symptomatic of a number of defects and
inequities which had crept into the legal system over the years,
Rama I established a Royal Commission to examine and revise
the entire corpus of Thai law. The result of their efforts,
completed in 1805, was known as the Law of the Three Seals,
representing in the eyes of its creators a return to the purity
of the thammasat itse If. 7
The Thai thammasat, as restated in the Law of the
Three Seals, elaborated considerably upon the format of the
Manu dharma-sastra, the Hindu code from which it was in-
directly derived. Although the traditional Indian texts con-
tained eighteen law titles concerning litigation, the Thai version
consisted of 39 such chapters, or laksana. Among the subjects
of the different laksana were, for example, laksana rap fpng,
the law for receiving plaints, laksana phua mia, the law of
husband and wife, laksana that, the law of slavery, and laksana
phayan, the law of evidence. Ten of the laksana dealt with
procedural matters, while the remaining 29 concerned topics
of substantive law. 8
The Thai thammasat also differed from the Hindu sastras
in that it reflected the strong influence of Buddhist philosophy
and cosmogony. The Hindu Code of Manu was the word of
Brahma himself, creator of the world, as it had been trans-
mitted to his offspring, the legendary Manu, and then to ten
Sages who preserved the teachings for mankind. 9 In the Thai-
Mon version, on the other hand, Manu was a counselor to the
first monarch in the history of the world. King Mahasammata,
a Bodhisattva, had been elected to rule by primitive men when
they found it necessary to choose a leader from among them-
selves in order to settle their disputes. The king could
interpret but not create the law, and it was ManuTs role to be
raised into the heavens until he reached the wall surrounding
the world. On this wall were carved the sacred laws which
Manu read and recounted to King Mahasammata. These laws
became, in the Thai version, the foundation of the thammasat. 10
Whereas Hindu theory would emphasize the divine
foundation of the rule of kings, the Thai thammasat described
a King of Righteousness, a Great Elect, who followed certain
precepts of just rule and abided by the ten kingly virtues: alms-
giving, morality, liberality, rectitude, gentleness, self-
restriction, non-anger, non-violence, forbearance, and
non-obstruction. 11 The king was to study the thammasat with
care and observe the four principles of justice: to examine
the propriety and quality of all work performed for him; to
protect and promote those who were honest; to obtain royal
revenues by just means alone; to maintain the happiness and
prosperity of his kingdom. 12 The king was not divine, but if
he ruled according to the principles of righteousness lie could
become recognized as a chakkraphat (chakravartin), a Universal
Sovereign possessing great power and moral influence through-
out the world. 13
In theory, therefore, the thammasat should have served
as a limit upon the exercise of absolute power by the Thai
kings. Although the king could not be restrained by any law
of man, his power was subject to the moral authority of the
thammasat itself, and he was bound to observe the rules and
precepts contained in it. In fact, however, there was no
formally constituted class or group in Thai society which
could enforce these rules against the king. The Devaraja
concept of kingship, with its air of mystery, aloofness, and
ritual, together with the Theravada Buddhist concept of the
king as an embryonic Buddha, combined to create a theory of
kingship which could indeed lend substance to claims of
unchallengeable and absolute power. 14
Regardless of the temporal power which a Thai king
might wield, however, he was subject like any other being to
the workings of thamma, or dharma, a concept basic to
the philosophy of the thammasat. It was believed that certain
immutable rules operated in the moral universe just as the
laws of physics operate in the natural universe. These
inexorable rules of moral behavior existed above the sometimes
arbitrary actions of individuals or their rulers, meting out
rewards and punishments in a transcendental system of justice.
The workings of thamma were the essence of the sacred laws
which Manu had learned and passed on to mankind. The concept
of thamma, or dharma, has been explained in the following
terms by a leading western historian of Indian and Thai law:
In external terms, dharma is the action which,
provided it is conformable to the order of things,
permits man to realise his destiny to the full,
sustains him in this life, and assures his well-
being after death. By its own virtue that act
produces a spiritual benefit for him who has
performed it, which will necessarily bear fruit
in the other world. Conversely, an act contrary
to dharma, called adharma, necessarily involves
a sanction, a MfallTt for the one who does it, which
will strike him in his future existence if not
actually in his present life. "Destroyed, Dharma
destroys; protected, he protects": so says Manu
(VIII. 15). In internal terms, dharma signifies
the obligation, binding upon every man who desires
that his actions should bear fruit, to submit
himself to the laws which govern the universe and
to direct his life in consequence. That obligation
constitutes his duty: and that is a further sense
of the word. 15
The principle of thamma, or dharma, provides one
explanation for the limited capacity of the traditional Thai
monarch to create permanent laws. 16 The king had no
theoretical power to legislate but merely to issue commands
which would protect the people and preserve the principles of
the thammasat. As chief judge, the Thai king could also
declare the law when disputes of the people came to him on
petition. In theory, however, these edicts and judicial
decisions had no permanent force. They were always subject
to revision or reversal by later rulers. The collection of
king-made law was known as rachasat, in contrast to the
thammasat itself. Rachasat was for the most part temporary
law, binding on the people because of the power of the king,
but lacking the inviolability and permanence of the thammasat.
Conceivably a king could, by royal edict, oppose the very
essence of the thammasat, but such deviations and impurities,
it was believed, would not last long. A later monarch, like
Rama I in his revision of the legal corpus, would inevitably
restore the law to its proper and permanent form. Such
restorations were inevitable because of the inexorable workings
of the thamma which would sooner or later destroy all unjust
laws:
—Commands of kings can only endure if they are in
conformity with Dharma, and not because of the
absolute power of kings, but because of the
transcending nature of the rule of dharma which is
underlying them. Rulers are auxiliaries of Dharma.
The true law-givers are Manu and those inspired
Sages who have revealed Dharma once for all. 17
Despite the theoretical inability of traditional Thai kings
to enact permanent laws, it has been observed that certain
royal decrees did in fact attain the status of legislation which
was preserved as part of the sacred code. The Thai thammasat
records not only the fundamental precepts attributed to Manu
(known as munla-at, or mula-attha) but also those rules of
law which were outgrowths (sakha-at, or sakha-attha) of the
fundamental precepts. These outgrowths came into existence
as Thai kings interpreted and elaborated the sacred law.
The decrees were strictly speaking rachasat, yet they could
acquire a permanent and respected status if they conformed
sufficiently to the sacred law. By a formal process, royal
enactments could be incorporated into the very text of the
thammasat:
A procedure is expressly provided for the
transformation of a royal decision into a rule
of law. They must be stripped of the features
which gave rise to them, and reduced in abstract
terms to the concise form of the precepts of the
law. They could then be added to the text of the
dhammasattha itself under the relevant rubric. 18
The remarkable legislative activity of King Chulalongkorn was
perhaps anticipated by this embryonic law-making capacity of the
traditional Thai kings. 19 in so far as the royal decisions and
decrees were themselves thamma, they could be abstracted
and integrated into the corpus of Thai law. In so far as the
laws departed from thamma, they became a nullity when the power
of their creator ended.
This distinction between temporary and lasting laws may
reflect what one anthropologist has described as a fundamental
dualism in the Thai social order. On the one hand there is
"merit" which is gained through selfless acts, particularly
acts by rich or powerful men such as kings. Such meritorious
acts are characterized by their effectiveness and their
permanence. On the other hand, there is npower,?r which
may also lead to short-term success but which, because of
its amoral character, will lack the permanence of truly
meritorious acts. The products of power, without the
presence of merit, will in time be destroyed. 2 0 This
analysis applies as well to the enactments of the Thai kings.
By virtue of their extraordinary power, the kings could
command almost any short-term result they might wish,
but unless their edicts were supported by selfless and
meritorious purposes, as delineated in the thammasat,
they would not least. Despite the opportunity for arbitrary
and capricious behavior there was thus a certain stability
and justice in the traditional system of rule:
Though power blurs the clear edges of cosmic
justice, one may think of justice lagging
behind, like a court with a clogged calendar,
in exacting punishments and awarding
compensations. 21
It is clear, however, that in the short run the power
of the king was supreme to preserve the law, to interpret
the law, and to create new law. There was no Parliament
free to act as a legislative counterbalance. There was
no tradition of a strong and independent judiciary which
might create a system of common law. There was no Magna
Carta standing between king and subjects as a symbol of
the rights and liberties of individuals which could be
enforced against an unjust king. In short, the essence of
the law was the king himself. The law was a justification
of kingship, and the king was the interpreter and creator
of law, limited only by the moral constraints enumerated
in the thammasat and by the belief that the rules of thamma
would eventually work their retribution upon unjust acts.
This, then, was the tradition of law and kingship
which was challenged and to some extent changed during the
era of reforms over which King Chulalongkorn presided.
As political pressures from the colonial powers on Thailand's
borders became more intense, as western ideas of government
came increasingly to influence the Thai elite, the traditional
assumptions were called more and more into question. King
Chulalongkorn's father, King Mongkut, had already found
it necessary to exercise his legislative powers more actively
than had his predecessors. There was a suggestion of new
thoughts about royal legitimacy as well in King Mongkutfs
revision of the traditional ceremony of allegiance to the
king. Instead of accepting passively a unilateral pledge
of loyalty from his officials and court, King Mongkut
made the ceremony bilateral by offering his own pledge as
sovereign to be loyal to his subjects. 2z Hints of change,
of new theories and ideas, were in the air. Significantly,
these ideas reached the king and the elite before they reached
the people. For this reason it was possible for the king to
seize the initiative, to act decisively not only to forestall
colonial intervention but to prevent public disenchantment
with the traditional system of absolute rule. 23
An essay by Prince Phitchit Prichak<pn entitled r?A
Consideration of Justice [thammasan winitchai]" written
in 1885,exemplifies the transition from traditional Thai and
Indian legal theory to newer ideas which were often influenced
by western thought. ^4 Prince Phitchit was a brother of King
Chulalongkorn and served as a member of his Privy Council
and later as Minister of Justice. Unlike many princes of his
and later generations, however, he was not sent to Europe
for his education. For this reason, perhaps, his ideas of
justice were more strongly rooted in the traditional than
was true in the case of his brothers and nephews. Nevertheless,
his essay was a conscious attempt to formulate a system of
natural law, implying some form of social compact between
the modern king and his subjects based upon the ancient concept
of thamma.
Prince Phitchit in his essay observed that "thamma"
was linked to the Thai word "thamniam ," which meant custom
or tradition. It was from thamniam, or custom, that a
system of law was formed. To be precise, there were four
thamma which acted as a foundation for the social activities
of all people and which served as a basis for their well-being
and contentment. The king, therefore, could enact laws
based upon these four thamma in order to ensure their
protection within the kingdom and thereby provide for the
welfare of his people. The four thamma to which Prince
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Phitchit referred were:
(1) The providing of food and sustenance. The king
could enact any law which would assure adequate food and
clothing for his people.
(2) The creation of plenty or abundance. The king
could enact laws which provided for times of war or famine
when men could not produce food for themselves.
(3) Equality and fair treatment. In men's necessary
dealings with one another, particularly in the area of trade
and commerce, laws should protect against the taking of
unfair advantage.
(4) Peacefulness and protection from danger. The
king could protect his people by means of military strength
from dangers both external and internal.
The power of the king to create law, according to
this scheme, would seem to arise out of four basic rules of
nature which were made apparent through ancient social
customs and usage. This theory alone represented a con-
siderable shift from the broad power of the absolute monarch
to enact any law necessary to protect the vague and general-
ized precepts of the thammasat. In addition, Prince PhitchitTs
treatment stressed to an unusual degree the role of the common
people both as beneficiaries of all proper laws and as source
of the legal system itself, for it was by their customary
practices that the four thamma were revealed.
Prince Phitchit observed that the four thamma were
constantly threatened with destruction by the four evils or
prejudices: illicit desires, hatred or anger, fear, and
ignorance. The role of the king was to protect the four thamma
from transgressions, both direct and indirect, through the
rewards and punishments which he meted out. By articulating
and publicizing a fair system of law and justice, the king made
known to all his subjects their rights and duties towards one
another. He thereby constructed a permanent framework for
the settlement of disputes and a body of rules for the conduct
of the people's affairs.
The concept of king as chao chiwit, or Lord of Life,
was conspicuously absent from Prince PhitchitTs analysis.
This was no monarch with absolute and arbitrary power of
11
life and death over his helpless subjects. Rather, the
king was a figure who performed certain socially necessary
tasks, whose legislative powers were defined by the basic
needs of the people, whose system of law arose not from
any sacred and mysterious source but from the nature and
practices of men as social beings. Traditional Buddhist
thought was central to Prince Phitchit rs analysis, but it
served less to idealize the king as a future Buddha than to
explain the necessity of fair laws for the protection of
property and the public well-being.
Prince Phitchit Prichakpn, in his essay on justice,
was a transitional figure. He was a member of the traditional
elite dealing in an imaginative way with influential and
alien ideas about the legitimacy of government under law.
A more dramatic and historically significant document was
written only two years later by a group of eleven princes
and officials all of whom, unlike Prince Phitchit, had
travelled or studied abroad. Among these men were three of
King Chulalongkorn?s brothers: Prince Phitthayalap, Prince
Naret, and Prince Sawat, the last having just completed his
legal studies at Oxford. 25 The document, presented to the
king on January 8, 1887, was a petition proposing bluntly
that the present form of government be replaced by a
parliamentary system under a written constitution. 26
The petition came near the end of a long period of
quiet after the young king's initial flurry of reform, and
was remarkable for several reasons. The very fact of its
presentation to the king revealed the extent to which ideas
of governmental change were current among the elite and
tolerated by the monarch himself. The mildness of the king's
reply was farther evidence of his readiness to listen even
to ideas which might challenge the very legitimacy of his
rule. The petition also underlined the extremity of the
danger to Thailand's security, threatened on both sides
by the aggressive colonialist activities of England and
France, and feared by the petitioners and the king to the
extent that they were willing to consider radical internal
changes.
The petition opened with the frank statement that
12
Thailand, as a country of little real power, was seriously
threatened by countries of great power. Thailand, it was
argued, should follow Japan's example and thoroughly
Europeanize her government in order to protect against this
threat. The European countries, despite their aggressive
intentions, would not seize a weaker nation without some
pretext to justify their warlike act:
(1) the pretext of humanitarianism--the invader
would assert that its aim was to bring happiness and
advancement to all men equally;
(2) the pretext that the backwardness of Asian
countries could somehow hinder the European countries in
their own advancement;
(3) the pretext that certain ineffective Asian
governments were incapable of protecting the persons and
property of Europeans and other Asians within their borders,
a situation which could be rectified by the replacement of
the local government with a colonial administration;
(4) the pretext of commerce--the European
countries could assure their own development and prosperity
by using the Asian countries as markets and as sources of
valuable raw materials. The petitioners compared the logic
of the Europeans to a familiar rule of Thai law: when a
person who owned a rice field failed to put it to productive
use, an outsider might be permitted to take over the field
in the hope that he would prove more worthy of possession.
The petitioners criticised on a number of grounds
the moderate reforms already begun by the king. Their
criticisms may be grouped under three general headings:
(1) A gradualist approach to reform would inevitably fail
as a defense against foreign encroachments. Thailand
could not merely adopt certain aspects of western advance-
ment without making fundamental changes in her system of
government. The gradualist approach had been tried in
Japan and had failed. Superficial reforms, like the abolition
of slavery or the establishment of a modern telegraph and
postal system were inadequate to inspire respect among the
European countries, and their sympathy or pity alone would
not protect Thailand. (2) Thailand could no longer rely on
her foreign trade or her natural resources as an inducement
for amicable relations with the colonial powers. If anything,
13
these factors would tempt the Europeans to seize Thailand
rather than to respect her sovereignty. Existing treaties
were likewise of little use, as the example of China clearly
proved. Nor should Thailand feel secure in her geographical
position as a buffer zone between the English and French
colonies, for these countries would still try to seize as much
territory and special advantage as possible. (3) Finally,
Thailand could not depend upon the protection of international
law as a deterrent against aggressive actions by the European
powers. This law was intended to apply only to the "civilised"
nations of the world and would surely fail if invoked by a
country like Thailand against a country like England or France.
Japan's rights as an equal and independent nation under inter-
national law had been recognized only after her government
was completely transformed and westernized, and the same
would be true in the case of Thailand.
What was proposed, then, was a European style of
government. The present system was seen as too heavily
dependent upon the king and royalty for its effective
functioning. Moreover, it was believed among Europeans
that the chief ministers did not work for the good of their
ministries and should be held more directly accountable to
the wishes of the people. The petitioners did not give many
details of the new system they wished to see installed, but
the proposal in its outline form was sweeping indeed. A
constitution was to be promulgated and a parliament estab-
lished. The absolute monarchy would be replaced by a
constitutional monarchy in which the king could share many
of his present responsibilities rather than personally involving
himself with each item of government work. A cabinet would
be established with major decision-making powers. Corruption
would be ended and government salaries raised to a sufficient
level. There would be equal rights under law for all persons,
including equality in the methods of taxation; and the laws
generally would grant equal status to Thais and westerners.
Old laws and customs would be eliminated if they offended
Europeans or impeded progress. Freedom of speech would be
guaranteed, including the right of public meetings and a free
press.
Despite some fairly substantial difficulties anticipated
in the implementation of these drastic changes, the writers
14
argued that the transformation could be successfully accom -
plished.Moreover the Thai people, far from being dismayed
by the loss of their traditional institutions of government,
would feel even greater love and allegiance for their country
when they realized that their rights under law were the equal
of any people's on earth.
King Chulalongkorn, in his written reply, firmly
declined to follow the suggestions of the petitioners. ^T He
cautioned that changes which might appear to them to be
warranted by the threat of foreign intervention would never-
theless be strongly opposed by certain groups within the Thai
government. These groups were in a position to limit the
extent and success of any reforms which the king might wish
to undertake. Although the king agreed with many of the
criticisms set forth in the petition, he was unable to conclude
that an immediate westernization of the government would
produce beneficial results.
King Chulalongkorn assured the petitioners that he had
no personal or selfish interest in preserving the absolute
power of the Thai monarchy. At the beginning of his reign,
he reminded them, he had been a mere puppet while the regent
had assumed all real power. The king compared his situation
during those years to that of a child who, in flying a kite,
had let out all the string. The child was forced to exert his
utmost strength merely to keep his balance or to prevent the
kite from escaping. Little by little he had rewound the string.
Since the powerful regent and his ministers had neglected the
traditional legislative function, the young king had seized
upon this area to reassert his royal power. He and his
advisory council through the enactment of new laws became,
as King Chulalongkorn described it, a kind of opposition to
the established government. As time went on the king had
gradually recovered control over the executive function as
well. While his executive powers increased, however, the
legislative function fell into disuse, for the king was unable
to manage both areas effectively at the same time. The affairs
of modern government had become too complex, and the king
lacked able assistants. In the interest of strengthening his
position as chief executive, the king had been forced to
sacrifice the vitality of the Thai law-making function.
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Despite the weakened condition of the legislative
function, however, King Chulalongkorn cited two factors
which prevented him from establishing a parliamentary
form of government in Thailand at that time. The first
factor was the inefficiency of the Thai bureaucracy, which
had to be reformed and made more effective before any broad
political change could be attempted. The second factor was
that Thailand then lacked a sufficient number of trained men
who could participate successfully in the drafting of new laws.
Furthermore, it was certain that the powerful ministers
would resist all such changes and, if it developed that they
were incompetent to perform their new duties, might even
resign in large numbers, creating an unprecedented crisis
in the Thai political system. In short, the king was able to
assure the petitioners only that change was inevitably drawing
nearer, that reform of the administrative system was the
necessary first step, and that such changes as they themselves
advocated could come only after the initial reforms were
successfully achieved.
From this dramatic confrontation between the reforming
king and an element of his western-educated elite, there
emerged a sharpened picture of the challenge facing the
traditional system. Without doubt, the time was one of great
peril to Thailand's sovereignty. Nor did many of the new
leaders of King Chulalongkorn's generation believe the present
system of government to be capable of meeting the dangers
their country faced. Change was inevitable if colonization
was to be avoided, but the question was what kind of change
and how fast and by what means. The king was either un-
willing or unable to sacrifice the traditional system of law
and kingship for an entirely new system based upon a
constitution and a parliament. But he was also unwilling and
unable to permit the present situation to continue without
fundamental reform.
King Chulalongkorn's own theories of law and kingship
had begun to emerge and develop from the very first days of
his reign as king. Although he was placed upon the throne
in 1868 at the age of fifteen, the actual task of governing
was officially performed by a regent until King Chulalongkorn's
second coronation as an adult in 1873. On the latter occasion
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the king issued a well-known proclamation abolishing the
ancient custom of prostration before royalty and high officials.
In this symbolic enactment are found the first indications of
a new attitude toward progress, reform, and kingship.
The young king in his proclamation described the
practice of prostration as a symbol of oppression imposed
by those of great status and power. This in itself was a
social evil, for it brought misery and weariness to the
little men who had to crouch and crawl and prostrate
themselves before figures of greater importance. This concern
with the happiness and well-being of the common people was
characteristic of the benevolent paternalism which ran through
many of King Chulalongkornrs writings and decrees. The
proclamation also noted that wherever such oppressive
practices had been eliminated, prosperity and progress had
surely followed. This, too, was a pattern of thought which
would recur throughout the years. By adopting certain
practices of the prosperous and developed countries, it was
believed that Thailand could itself become prosperous and
developed. It was this very approach which the European-
educated petitioners criticized in their proposal for govern-
mental change in 1887, referring to it as a superficial form
of gradualism. Finally, the young king concluded, the process
of change must be a gradual one. There would be many
changes, but they could not come all at once and must await
their appropriate time. For the present, it was sufficient
that by eliminating the custom of prostration the king had
called for an end to unjust oppression. 8 PKPS 114 .
The process of change was indeed to prove a difficult
task, characterized by eager bursts of reforming zeal
followed by extended periods of political difficulty and in-
activity. These peaks and valleys have been charted by one
historian as follows: an initial period of enthusiastic reform
lasted from 1873 until the "Front Palace Incident of
December 1874. This crisis, involving an attempted coup by
the upparat or "second king?
?t very nearly resulted in British
intervention against the throne, and was followed by more
than ten years of political caution and quiescence on the part
of King Chulalongkorn. A new period of activity began in the
second half of the 1880s, leading to the establishment of a
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Cabinet system of government in 1892. Again, however, a
period of political crisis ensued and, in 1893, a conflict with
France nearly brought the two countries to war. For three
years, until 1895, the king rested and recovered both
politically and emotionally, but then began once again his task
of reform. It was during this period, from 1895 until the
king's death in 1910, that he permanently consolidated his
power, reorganized the government bureaucracy, reformed
the legal system, and twice travelled to Europe. 29
Despite the varying pace of reform and governmental
change, however, a certain consistency and logical continuity
may be observed throughout the entire thirty-eight years of
King Chulalongkorn's reign. While change was encouraged
and promoted in many ways, it was resisted when it threatened
the structure of the monarchy itself. While European laws and
methods of government were studied and adopted to some extent,
the fundamental theory of constitutional government was held
at arm's length. While parliamentary forms and methods were
used in appointed legislative bodies, the notion of a truly
representative system never became more than a suggestion or
a prophecy.
The king himself in 1888 discussed the issue of royal
power and parliamentary government in a revealing passage
from his Speech Explaining the Governmental Reforms. ^0
The power of the king, he observed, was not specified by any
law for it was believed to be free from all restraints and
obstacles which could be imposed by law or man. However,
he continued, the actions of the king must always be fitting and
just, and for this reason he would not object to a delineation
of the powers of the king under law, as had been done in other
countries, when laws were established as a basis for govern-
ment throughout the kingdom.
After making this rather remarkable concession,
however, the king digressed with the observation that such
limitations upon royal power had arisen in other countries
because of the people's dissatisfaction with an unrestrained
monarchy. This was not the case in Thailand, where the
people had requested no such limitation but the king himself
thought it should be imposed. King Chulalongkorn desired
such a change because, characteristically, he believed it
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would advance and develop the country and bring happiness to
the people. Since a different necessity compelled the
specification of royal power in Thailand, the specification
itself would take on a different form than it had in other
countries. Thus, for example, Thailand could not be governed
by a parliamentary system like those in certain European
countries, nor would the people of Thailand desire such a
system. Few men would be capable of serving as members
of parliament and none would have experience in governing,
so nothing would be accomplished. The people would not
trust the members of parliament as they trusted the king, for
they knew that the king was just and that he loved the people
and desired their happiness more than any other person could.
Therefore, the king concluded, the royal power should
be stated as it had always existed. Which is to say, the
unlimited power of the king should be retained. While King
Chulalongkorn suggested that the dramatic expression "Lord
of Life" be abandoned, it was not because the Thai king lacked
an absolute and unrestrained power to take the life of a subject
without any cause. Rather it was because no king had ever
done so, and presumably it would be inappropriate to publicize
an arbitrary power which was never exercised.
In this fashion, King Chulalongkorn accepted the
European concept of a royal power limited and specified by
law and yet reaffirmed the traditional Thai concept of an
absolute monarch capable of acting beyond the restraints of
any temporal law. The apparent implication of this passage
was that western forms would be studied, copied, and put to
use in Thailand, but not beyond a certain point. The
traditional Thai monarchy was so central to the society, to
the people and to the effective functioning of the government,
that the king would net permit it to be weakened or restrained
by any law or rival institution.
In his reign as king, Rama V acted not to restrain the
monarchy but to centralize and consolidate the royal power.
In an article by two Thai scholars it is asserted that the key
to this consolidation of power was the abolition of the phrai
system-- a complex organization of master-client relation-
ships through which the nobility had been able to control vast
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resources of manpower. By replacing the phrai hierarchy
with a government-regulated system of taxation and military
draft, the king weakened the political power of the nobility
and was able to reform the old ministries and modernize the
country's administrative structure without fear of opposition
by the once powerful nobles. 31 However, these same
writers contend, the king made no attempt to build political
institutions which would preserve and protect the unprecedent-
ed power which he had accumulated. Indeed, it is argued that
the king foresaw and desired the arrival of parliamentary
government in Thailand at some point in the future. Although
he did not consider a representative form of government
possible during his own reign, it is contended that his ultimate
purpose was to build the foundations for a democratic system. 32
This matter has caused some disagreement among
scholars. One Thai commentator, a confirmed anti-royalist,
portrays King Chulalongkorn as a despot adamantly opposed
to any form of true democracy:
The urge underlying his efforts was to moder-
nise his country. He went to Europe twice and
brought back with him new ideas. But he was
not unlike other despots, who can not extricate
themselves from the lure of despotic power. . . .
(T)he King was sceptical as to the wisdom of a
new order. The lure of absolute rule made
him find all sorts of excuses to delay the change,
even when that change was beating at the bars
of circumstances It was a pity that
democracy had no meaning to him at all, although
in Europe it had reached its apogee. The King
tried to evade it by a benevolent rule. 33
A prominent English historian, on the other hand, saw King
Chulalongkorn and his successors as TTpreparing the way for
the adoption of a democratic form of government,rT 34 a view
shared by many other observers both Thai and western.
This question is difficult indeed when framed in terms
of motive or intent. The question may be recast, however,
in terms which are more susceptible to analysis. It may be
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asked what, precisely, was the legal effect of the various
acts and proclamations of King Chulalongkorn ? To what
extent was there an alteration of or limitation upon the tradi-
tional royal power in relation to the law ? How serious was
the experimentation with parliamentary forms of debate and
legislation? To what degree did the people gain a voice in
the workings of the government? What new rights were created
for the people under law, and how were these rights to be
enforced against the government?
A closer analysis of the laws enacted during the reign
of King Chulalongkorn will show that the answers to these
questions are not simple. In certain areas, the king showed
little willingness at all to depart from the traditional system.
The legislative function, for example, was firmly controlled
by the king throughout most of his reign. In other areas,
however, the situation was a good deal more complex. In the
area of individual rights, particularly, a change can be
observed which may foreshadow the revolutionary events that
followed the death of King Chulalongkorn by only twenty-two
years. After a brief description of the administrative reforms
under King Chulalongkorn, these questions will be examined
in some detail.
B. Changes in the Administrative Structure
The reorganization of the government bureaucracy
was for King Chulalongkorn the reform upon which all further
progress depended. It was not the earliest of his important
reforms, coming as it did in the mid-1890s, but it was
fundamental to his reign in at least two respects. For one
thing, many of his other important changes, such as the
reorganization of the judiciary and the new laws of provincial
administration, can be understood only with reference to the
bureaucratic changes. Secondly, the transformation of the
bureaucracy provided a further expression of King Chulalong-
korn's theory of kingship and revealed the extent to which he
was willing to depart from custom and tradition.
The traditional system of central administration was
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itself the product of reform, an attempt by King Trailok of
Ayutthaya to transform a feudal style of territorial rule into
a "centralized and functionally differentiated system of
administrationTr under the personal direction of the king's
own ministers. ^5 This effort, apparently influenced by
Khmer administrative concepts, became necessary as the
kingdom of Ayutthaya expanded geographically and required a
stronger and more effective method of centralized rule. With
the passage of time, however, the old bureaucracy lost much
of the Tfunctionally differentiated'T character which King
Trailok had sought to instill in it and became instead a confus-
ing amalgam of territorial jurisdiction, overlapping responsib-
ilities, and obsolete departments with little or no functional
justification.
The bureaucracy inherited by King Chulalongkorn was
led, at least in theory, by two principal figures: the Chief
Minister of mahatthai, the civilian division, and the Chief
Minister of kalahom, the military division. In addition, there
were four lesser ministries: khlang (the Treasury), muang
(the City), wang (the Palace), and rm (Lands or Fields), and
a number of sub-ministries grouped under each of these. By
King Chulalongkornrs time, however, it was no longer accurate
to speak of the two greater and the four lesser ministries, nor
could most of the six ministries be described in terms of the
functions they were once intended to perform. It would be more
proper to group the khlang, or Treasury, with mahatthai and
kalahom as the most important of the ministries, and to
identify each of these three with a geographical region.
After a rebellion in the southern province of Nakorn
Sri Thammarat in 1691 A.D., it was thought.desirable to
establish a more unified system of control over the manpower
and administration of the outlying areas. Kalahom therefore
assumed control over both civilian and military men available
for service in the South, while mahatthai performed a similar
function in the North. 3 6 In this way the distinction between
military and civilian administration was blurred, and the
geographical distinction replaced it once again in importance.
The primary function of both ministries became the registration
of manpower in their respective regions. 3 7 By the nineteenth
century this function was not only a means of asserting the
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capital's control over the countryside, but was also a source
of personal power, status, and wealth for the ministers and
their subordinates. In addition to the registration of manpower,
the Chief Ministers of mahatthai and kalahom administered the
provinces under their respective controls, served as troop
commanders to suppress revolts, established law courts
within their ministries which heard appeals from the courts of
the provincial governors, and collected taxes which were
assessed within the provinces for use by the central govern-
ment. 38
The khlang, or Ministry of the Treasury, originally
had charge of all revenues and expenses of the central govern-
ment and, in its own courts of law, administered lawsuits
arising from such matters. Another important function, the
administration of foreign affairs, devolved upon a department
within the khlang (the krom tha, or Department of the Port)
as a result of its key role in regulating foreign trade. 39 in
addition to these two major responsibilities, khlang at one time
assumed control over the southern provinces which had until
then been administered by kalahom. Overwhelmed by its
numerous responsibilities, khlang abandoned its role as
Treasurer for the central government, and this function was
divided among the other departments of the bureaucracy. Later
khlangTs area of geographical control was to shrink to a limited
number of coastal provinces, as kalahom resumed its super-
vision of the South. 40
The other three ministries played lesser roles in the
administration of the kingdom. Miiang, also known as
nakhpnbau, was in charge of police and other administrative
affairs in the capital, as well as lawsuits involving serious
offenses, and prisons. 41 Wang, dealt mostly with affairs
concerning the palace itself, such as state ceremonies and
personal requirements of the king and royal family. Na
administered matters dealing with lands, rice crops, and the
royal storehouses, as well as traditional agricultural cere-
monies and other encouragements to the people to cultivate
their crops with care and diligence. Like the other ministries,
irahad its own courts to decide cases arising within its area of
responsibility, and also administered its own revenues and
expenditures. 42
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The government in each province was modeled upon
the central government in the capital. The governor played a
role analogous to that of the king, while his deputy governor
was comparable to the upparat or "second king," and the
various local officials performed tasks similar to those of the
ministers. The provinces outside the central region were
grouped into three classes, with those of higher rank exercis-
ing administrative control over those of lower rank. Although
the autonomy of the provinces tended to increase in proportion
to their distance from the capital, the king was able to exert
some direct control over local affairs by the appointment of
the governor and, through the Palace Ministry, the yokkrabat.
This latter figure was an inspector or "spy" for the central
government, empowered to make inquiries into all misbe-
havior of local officials including the governor himself, and
to sit with the governor in judging lawsuits, reporting at his
own discretion to the central government. ^
To this brief outline of the traditional system of
administration, it should perhaps be added that two royal
councils served the king in rather different ways. The lukkhun
na sala was a group consisting of the ministers and the heads
of the important departments. They advised the king on
general matters of administration and on the issuance of
various royal enactments and communications with the
provinces. 45 ^he lukkhun na san luang , on the other hand,
was a group of Brahmin legal experts whose important and un-
usual role in deciding issues of law will be examined in Chapter
3. The reforms of King Chulalongkorn were to affect
significantly both of these royal councils.
King Chulalongkorn7s criticism of the existing bureau-
cratic structure was sharp and specific. In his Speech Explain-
ing the Governmental Reforms he observed that the traditional
framework of two chief ministries and four lesser ministries
bore little relationship to the present functional workings of
the government. A true analysis of the bureaucracy revealed
a senseless and anachronistic overlap between civilian and
military administrative institutions. 46 The judicial system,
scattered as it was among numerous ministries and depart-
ments, had become chaotic and unworkable. 4? The collecting
of taxes had likewise become hopelessly confused and corrupt,
with the resulting depletion of the royal treasuries leaving the
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government paralyzed for lack of funds. 48
In conclusion, the king contended that the old forms
were no longer applicable to present needs. The effectiveness
of each ministry depended largely on the particular man in
charge, with the result that some ministries had little to do
while others were overburdened with work. Hard work often
went unrewarded, however, while lazy men reaped great
benefits. Because the lines of administration had become so
blurred and disorganized through the years, the king announced,
it would be necessary to reform the entire bureaucracy. A
new system would be established in which one person had over-
all responsibility for each governmental function. In addition,
accurate budgets would be prepared with expenditures
appropriate to the work actually performed. 49
The king went on to elaborate his plan to replace the
old system of six ministries with a new system of twelve
ministries, each with a specific function which the king
expected it to perform. The six old divisions would be retain-
ed with important modifications:
(1) Mahatthai would now administer the northern
provinces and Laos. 50
(2) Kalahom would administer the southern, western,
and eastern provinces and the Malayan terr i tories . 51
(3) Tha, formerly a section of the Treasury in charge
of foreign affairs, would now control foreign affairs exclusively
without any role in administering the coastal provinces as
before.
(4) Wang would continue to supervise the affairs of the
palace.
(5) Muang would be in charge of police, prisons, and
the registration of citizens.
(6) Na would administer agriculture, commerce,
forests, and mines.
In addition to the six old divisions, the king created
six new ministries by splitting off some of the former functions
of the traditional ministries, by elevating several sub-minis-
tries to positions of greater importance, and by creating
others out of whole cloth:
(7) Khlang, relieved of its numerous former
responsibilities, would now devote its activities exclusively to
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administering all revenues and expenditures for the entire
government.
(8) Yutitham, a Ministry of Justice, would supervise
all courts in the central system, hearing every type of case.
(9) Thammakan would administer religious affairs ,
schools, and hospitals.
(10) Yuthanathikan would perform the role of Defense
Ministry and would handle all matters involving military
conscription.
(11) Yothathikan would function as a Ministry of Public
Works, in charge of building roads, canals, railroads, and
telegraph and postal systems.
(12) Murathathikan would act as keeper of the privy
seal and office of the royal clerks and scribes. ^2
In this manner, King Chulalongkorn first announced
his sweeping revision of the traditional administrative
structure. By 1896 the process of reorganization was largely
completed and many of the older and more conservative
ministers were replaced by the king's own appointees, often
brothers of the king, men of the same generation and ideology,
many with European educations. The administrative and
political significance of this crucial change has been well
documented. 53 in addition, however, King ChulalongkornTs
transformation of the central administration also marked a
significant departure from the traditional theories of kingship.
The reformation of the bureaucracy, like King
Chulalongkorn?s decree abolishing prostration, was evidence
that the prupose of government was not merely to exist but to
function, and to function in a way that would prove beneficial
to the people. It was no longer sufficient that the government
exist merely to maintain the monarch. King Chulalongkorn
was determined to establish a rationalized and effective
government in order to provide for the public well-being and
thus ensure the longevity of the administration itself:
We will administer the country well if we
foster opportunities for the people to earn
livings so that they are benefited by the
government. Then they will pay the taxes
which are the economic foundation of the
government. Consequently, an effective
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administration and a fostering of the ways
of providing for the livelihood of the people
are the most important, the final purposes
of the Kingdom.54
If, as it has been suggested, there was some TTcosmo-
magic principle" underlying the ancient ministry structure, 55
Rama V did not hesitate to disturb the heavens in his reform-
ation of it. The traditional system was simply incapable of
acting in the manner which the king believed essential, not
only for the benefit of the people but for the preservation of
the kingdom. In his transformation of the administrative
system, moreover, King Chulalongkorn opened for himself a
gateway to the changes in law and society which he wished to
achieve. It was by this means alone that he could accomplish
his policies in the three general areas which are the primary
subjects of this study: the legislative function, the judicial
function, and the rights of private citizens.
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CHAPTER 2
THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION
A. The Early Period: Privy Council and Council
of State
On May 8, 1874 , King Chulalongkorn proclaimed
the establishment of two advisory councils to consult with him
on important matters of state and to assist in the enactment
of laws for the kingdom. 8 PKPS 154. In characteristic
fashion the king explained that the purpose of these councils
was to bring greater well-being to the people, to eradicate
old customs which served only to oppress, and to hasten the
advancement and development of the country. The king stated
that he had travelled across the sea to visit foreign lands, to
observe the customs of the more advanced nations, and to
select those practices which might prove of value and use to
Thailand. 1 The foreign origin of the advisory bodies them-
selves was emphasized by the transliterated English phrases
"council of stateTT and TTprivy council7T used in the proclamation.
The general purpose of the advisory councils was to
discuss important matters with the king and to aid in the creation
of new laws. The king intended, according to the proclamation,
to confer with them before establishing new statutes or policies
and to solicit their suggestions or their criticisms. The members
would be free to disagree frankly with the views of the king and
need not fear any punishment for expressing their disapproval
of his ideas. Under certain conditions, moreover, the members
themselves could initiate discussion of matters they considered
important. Indeed, it was intended that the Privy Councilors,
in particular, bring defects or evils in the administration to
the attention of the king and offer thei r suggestions for
correction.
In a related royal edict the king provided a
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statutory foundation for the new advisory councils. The Council
of State was to be composed of ten to twenty men selected by
the king on the basis of ability, reputation, and family. 8 PKPS
170 (Paragraph 1). The senabpdi, or ministers in the
traditional bureaucratic structure, were also allowed to attend
meetings whenever the topic under discussion was relevant to
their work or whenever the king permitted them to join for any
reason. The senabpdi were not, however, to be counted among
the original ten to twenty members. In addition to the original
councilors and the senabpdi, six relatives of the king were also
to be appointed to the Council of State. (Paragraph 2). Any of
the councilors or the six royal relatives could be removed by
the king, and the members themselves could request such a
dismissal by a petition and letter of explanation signed by at
least six of their number. (Paragraphs 1 and 2). Resignations
required the approval of the king, and any member who resigned
from the Council was required to resign from all other
governmental positions as well. (Paragraph 24). The rank
and salary of the councilors placed them at a level below that
of the major ministers. (Paragraph 3).
Each member of the Council of State was required
to swear an oath of office before he was allowed to participate
in any of the meetings. (Paragraph 4). This oath, consisting
of seven provisions, pledged honesty, integrity, and loyalty
to the interests of the king and people. Each councilor was to
work to the best of his ability to promote the progress of the
people and to avoid disgrace to the Council. Corruption and
personal gain were to be eschewed. The secrecy of the Council's
proceedings was not to be violated. Decisions of the Council
were to be supported and strengthened, and any obstruction of
the Council's work by a fellow councilor was to be opposed.
The king himself was to act as President of the
Council, free to attend meetings or not, as he pleased.
(Paragraph 5). The other officers were the Vice-President
and the Clerk. The Vice-President, elected each year by the
membership with the king's approval, was to preside over
meetings in the king's absence. (Paragraph 6). In addition,
he was to sign important documents, count votes, act as the
Council's spokesman to the king, and resolve deadlocked
disputes when the king himself was absent. (Paragraph 7).
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When the king chose not to attend meetings of the Council, he
could communicate his wishes to the members by letters which
were to be read by the Vice-President to the other councilors.
(Paragraph 9).
The procedural rules of the Council of State were
marked by two significant features: an emphasis upon free
and equal discussion among the members and a requirement
that voting upon legislation be unanimous. The topics for
discussion were generally decided by the king and conveyed
to the Council either in person or by letter. It was possible,
however, for the members themselves to initiate discussion
on matters which two or more wished to place before the
Council. In such cases, it was necessary first to raise the
issue with the king in private. If the king thought the matter
appropriate for discussion he would then submit it to the
Council as a whole. Proclamation, 8 PKPS 154, 156.
Unanimous approval was necessary before any
measure could become law. Whenever a vote revealed that
the membership was divided, each side was to restate its own
point of view and the king was to approve one or the other. The
proponents of the favored point of view were then to rewrite
their proposal, attempting to incorporate other viewpoints as
well. A second vote would then be taken, and any remaining
dissenters were to offer specific suggestions for improvement.
Proclamation, 8 PKPS 154, 157. It was probably believed that
no strenuous objection would persist long in the face of
opposition by a majority of the Council and the king himself.
Moreover, behavior by any member which was regarded as
particularly obstructive or improper was subject to censure
by the Vice-President, the Council as a whole, or even by the
king. 8 PKPS 170 (Paragraph 21).
Another procedural rule worthy of note was the
participation of Privy Councilors in the meetings of the Council
of State. The king could invite Privy Councilors, either
individually or as a group, to attend meetings which dealt with
issues related to their own work. In such cases, the Privy
Councilors were permitted to participate in the discussion and
the framing of laws, and to cast their votes like the Councilors
of State. When the king had not requested their presence, Privy
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Councilors were nevertheless allowed to attend meetings upon
written invitation by the Councilors of State if such invitations
were signed by at least six members. In the latter instance,
however, the Privy Councilors were permitted only to speak
but not to amend or revise legislation nor to participate in the
voting. (Paragraph 23).
The royal edict establishing the Privy Council,
8 PKPS 185, was less complex and stringent than that of the
Council of State, for the purpose of the Privy Council was ad-
visory rather than legislative. The membership of the Privy
Council was to be composed of an indefinite number of men se-
lected by the king from the royalty or the government bureau-
cracy. (Paragraph 1). These men would serve permanently in
their advisory positions, receiving no elevation in rank but an
increase in sakdina (or rfdignity marks")2 and a pension after ten
years of service. (Paragraphs 1, 2, 8). All members were re-
quired to swear an oath like that of the Councilors of State. There
was no provision for the voluntary resignation of Privy Council-
ors, but the king could remove members for behavior inappro-
priate to their station. (Paragraph 9). It was not required that
such members must then resign from all other government posi-
tions as well, as was the case for the Councilors of State.
The rules and regulations of the Council of State were
to be observed by the Privy Councilors, even in their own meet-
ings. (Paragraph 10). In addition, the members were required
to elect a chairman for any meeting of the Council or of its com-
mittees or appointed groups. The chairman would then preside
in accordance with the procedural rules of the Council of State.
(Paragraph 11). Although it was normally forbidden to meet
without formal invitation, this was permitted in emergency sit-
uations. (Paragraph 7). It was also possible for the king to
appoint special royal commissions, whose members were se-
lected by the king from among the Privy Councilors. Such com-
missions would investigate specially designated subjects and
present their findings in written form to the king. The king might
then order their reports to be read to the Privy Council as a
whole. (Paragraph 6).
In general, it was required that the Privy Council-
ors keep the king informed on all important matters within their
knowledge. Failure to do so was regarded as dereliction of duty.
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Information presented to the king in writing must be signed by
the councilor submitting it. (Paragraph 13). in this way the
Privy Council would help the king to decide important issues
and to lead the Council of State in its work. It was imagined
that service upon the Privy Council might train young men of
ability and intelligence to aid the Council of State in later years.
Proclamation, 8 PKPS 154, 158.
Finally, a special provision was made for the es-
tablishment at the king's discretion of a Committee of the Privy
Council. This Committee would consist of members of the
Privy Council appointed by the king to function as a special
court. The Committee would be empowered to investigate
government work and to decide with judicial finality issues
involving government officials. (Paragraph 15). Decisions of
the Committee would be reached by majority vote, and both
the majority and the minority views were to be presented to
the king in writing. (Paragraph 16). Proceedings of the Com-
mittee could be conducted in public or in private, but in either
case the Committee could not prohibit the senabpdi or the
Councilors of State from attending. (Paragraph 18).
Both the Privy Council and the Council of State
caused great political friction between the young and liberal
faction associated with the king and the older and more con-
servative forces associated with the former regent. The
conservatives resented the new system as an alien intrusion
upon the status quo aimed, they believed, at the destruction of
their own political power. Most of them refused to serve on
either council, suspecting that their influence would be out-
balanced by that of the king's own faction and fearing that their
oath of office might be used against them.
In a move of some political importance, the oath of
office was indeed used as the statutory basis for dismissing
from the Privy Council the Minister of Lands in October, 1874,
8 PKPS 222. In a proclamation explaining the dismissal of
Phraya Ahanbcprirak from the Privy Council, King Chulalongkorn
cited three provisions of the councilor's oath which had been
violated: the pledge to advise truthfully and to the best of his
ability and intelligence in the manner most likely to promote
goodness, welfare, progress, and the high standing of the
Council itself; the pledge to act in accordance with his office
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to ensure a progressive and useful reign and to promote the
welfare and morals of the people without hidden favoritism to
friends, family or relatives; and the pledge to behave in a man-
ner appropriate to the station of Privy Councilor, that is with
goodness, honesty, love of king, and the avoidance of misdeeds.
8 PKPS 191 (Paragraphs 1, 2, 7). Contrary to this oath, the
proclamation stated, Phraya Ahanbprirak had not properly
performed his duties as head of the Ministry of Lands. There
was evidence that he had received funds illegally obtained by
other corrupt officials and had himself been guilty of the mis-
appropriation of royal monies allocated to his ministry. The
king therefore exercised his power under Paragraph 9 of the
Edict of the Privy Council, 8 PKPS 185, to dismiss any member
who misused his office or performed deeds inappropriate to
his station.
To a certain extent, therefore, the statutory pro-
visions of the two councils were applied in a literal manner,
with the king justifying his actions by the terms of these laws
rather than by reference to his powers as absolute monarch.
This practice, however, this period of experimentation, was
not to last long. The friction between the two political factions
increased with time, largely because of the refusal of the
conservative wing to participate on the councils. The increased
hostility between liberals and conseratives led directly to the
Front Palace Incident of 1874-75, and this crisis permanently
neutralized the political power of the two councils. The Front
Palace Incident marked the end of the effective functioning of
any legislative or quasi-legislative body in Thailand for the
next twenty years. ̂
Before the crisis of December 1874 and the sub-
sequent inactivity of the Council of State and the Privy Council,
King Chulalongkorn had offered his own explanation and defense
of the new system. In three related documents the king de-
scribed his conception of the legislative function at this early
stage in his reign. Whether these statements were intended
to persuade the opposition or to justify his position to the people
at large, they raised some important questions about new and
old theories of kingship.
The Council of State was justified primarily by its
record of improvements in the collecting of royal revenues.
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Through improved efficiency in the accounting and collection
procedures and through the replacement of corrupt revenue
agents with honest new men, it was becoming possible to stop
an enormous drain on government funds and to end the unwor -
thy behavior of government officials. In this way, without
adding to the tax burden upon the people, vital improvements
could be financed which would benefit the people, stimulate
foreign trade, and bring technological advancement to the
kingdom. 8 PKPS 271.
The activities of the Privy Council were explained
in more general terms by the four functions the Council was
intended to perform. First, the Privy Council was to inform
the king of issues which caused distress among the people so
that he could raise these problems with the Council of State
and the ministers and thereby alleviate them. Second, the
Privy Council served as an investigating body and a forum of
justice for governmental matters where a fair inquiry and
disposition was required. Third, the Council served as a
preparatory step for outstanding young men for whom no high
governmental office was yet available but whose ability the king
wished to utilize. Finally, the Council served as an example
of honest government, for each member was bound by his oath
to absolute integrity of action. 8 PKPS 275.
In a third and related document the king set forth
two general benefits to be derived from a royal council. One
such benefit was its opposition to corruption and unproductive
practices. The other benefit was the council's capacity to
obstruct or delay the king himself when he sought to act in a
manner which was unjust or which might cause hardship to the
people. 8 PKPS 269. It is questionable, however, just how
seriously the king believed that his own power as monarch could
be obstructed by a council which he himself created. Com-
mentators have pointed to such phrases, together with the king's
willingness to specify his powers under law, as evidence that
he did indeed intend to limit his powers as absolute monarch
and subordinate them to the statutory powers of bodies such
as the Council of State and the Privy Council. Such conclusions,
however, are probably unjustified. It was not unusual, even
in the old days of the traditional kingship, for the law to re-
quire that the men serving the king "obstruct" or delay him
when he sought impulsively to perform an unjust act. ^ Such
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opposition to the royal will did not in any sense derogate from
the king's supreme role as protector and interpreter of the
sacred law.
More importantly, however, the entire statutory
framework of the Privy Council and the Council of State reveals
an almost unlimited power of the king to control the legislative
process. An analysis of the statutes themselves discloses
some of the ways in which the king could dominate the workings
of the two councils:
Council of State
le The king had exclusive power to select new
members. 8 PKPS 170 (Paragraph 1).
28 In addition to the ten to twenty ordinary members
of the Council, the king could appoint six of his own relatives
who, it may be presumed, would share his views on many
issues. (Paragraph 2).
3. The king could dismiss any member, or refuse
to do so, upon petition by six councilors. (Paragraph 1).
It is not stated whether or not the king could dismiss members
without such a petition as he did in the case of Phraya Ahan-
bprirak in the Privy Council.
4. No matter could be discussed without the prior
approval of the king. If at least two members sought to raise
a topic for discussion they had first to approach the king in
private and seek his permission. Proclamation, 8 PKPS 154,
156.
5. If the king was absent, he could still control
the meetings by official communications sent to the Vice-Pres-
ident to be read to the Council. (Paragraph 9).
6. The king presided over the Council as its Pres-
ident whenever he chose to attend its meetings. (Paragraph 5).
78 The selection of a Vice-President by vote of
the members was subject to the approval of the king. (Para-
graph 6).
8. The king could remove the Vice-President
from office in mid-term if dissatisfied with his work. (Para-
graph 6).
9. In voting by the councilors to amend or correct
legislation, the king could cast the tie-breaking vote. If a
voting deadlock arose in the king's absence, the matter had to
be tabled. (Paragraph 19).
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10. In voting by the councilors to enact legislation,
agreement had to be unanimous and the king could indicate his
approval or disapproval in any matter where the councilors
were divided. Presumably the king also retained ultimate
discretion to refuse to sign a measure even in the unlikely
circumstance that the entire membership of the Council should
vote against him. Proclamation, 8 PKPS 154, 157.
11. The king could add new voting members to the
Council of State by inviting his Privy Councilors to attend
meetings and participate in debate and in voting. Privy Coun-
cilors invited to attend by members of the Council of State,
however, did not have the right to vote. (Paragraph 23).
12. The king could invite the powerful and influ-
ential senabpdi to join in meetings of the Council. (Paragraph 2).
13. No resignation became effective without the
king's approval, and any resignee was required to leave his
other official positions at the same time. (Paragraph 24).
14. Members who were forced to resign received
lower pensions than those who resigned by choice. (Para-
graph 25).
15. The oath of office was required of each member.
This oath imposed obligations of honesty and integrity and
also created norms of behavior which might discourage dis-
sent among the councilors, such as the pledge to work in the
interests of the king, to support the decisions of the Council,
and to oppose obstructive or negative behavior by fellow members,,
(Paragraph 4).
Privy Council
1. The king had exclusive power to select new
members, and could choose as many members as he wished.
8 PKPS 185 (Paragraph 1),
2. The king had the power to dismiss members for
misuse of their position or for behavior inappropriate to their
station. (Paragraph 9).
3. The members were obligated by law to inform
the king of important matters within their knowledge and could
be regarded as remiss in their duties for failure to do so.
(Paragraph 13).
4. The Privy Council was forbidden to meet with-
out invitation unless an emergency arose, for reasons proba-
bly related to the safety of the king. (Paragraph 7).
5. The king had exclusive power to create and staff
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Royal Commissions which would investigate and report to him
on specific subjects. (Paragraph 6).
6. The king had exclusive power to establish a
Committee of the Privy Council with investigatory and quasi -
judicial powers over issues arising in the bureaucracy. The
king could appoint the CommitteeTs Chairman if he chose, and
the Committee was required to report its findings and its
decisions to the king. (Paragraphs 15, 16, 17).
7. Each member of the Privy Council was bound
by an oath of office like that of the Councilors of State. (Para-
graph 3).
8. The power of the king to control voting and
procedural matters in the Council of State would apply to the
Privy Council as well, for the same rules were used there.
(Paragraph 10).
It may be concluded that the power of the royal
councils to "obstruct" or oppose the royal will was not a re-
alistic probability with regard to the legislative function at
that time. In addition to the king's statutory controls over the
workings of the councils, there were several other factors
which prevented the councils from acting in an independent
parliamentary fashion. One was the fact that the ministers
were still a major political power and held a rank superior
to that of the councilors. Their strong opposition to any mea-
sure would surely increase the likelihood of its failure. Another
factor was the historic deference and awe accorded to the king
himself. Regardless of King ChulalongkornTs own intent to
limit his powers or to subordinate the royal prerogative to a
quasi-parliamentary system, it would be an unusual councilor
indeed who would dare to oppose any firm expression of the
royal will. Even the explicit provisions protecting the right
of the councilors to speak openly and without fear might prove
insufficiently reassuring to those whose own careers and
future well-being were dependent upon the favor of the king."
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B. The Later Period: The Legislative Council,
Provincial Legislative Powers, and the
Legislative Function During the Regency
1. The Legislative Council
After the Front Palace Incident of 1874-1875, King
Chulalongkorn did not choose to delegate his legislative powers
again until the creation of the Legislative Council, or
ratthamontri sapha, of 1895. 7 The Legislative Council was
different from the earlier Privy Council and Council of State
not only in its longevity but in its fundamental tone and purpose.
In the establishment of the later body there was less emphasis
upon the symbolism of modernity and progress, less attention
paid to the adopting of western practices as a means to achieve
progress, no borrowing of English words and phrases to under-
line the foreign origins of the institution. The Legislative
Council was not merely an experiment but a deliberate response
to the kingTs need for assistance in a major restructuring of
Thailand's legal framework. The policy of gradualism and the
practice of borrowing western forms were still very much
alive; but there was now, perhaps, less faith in the potency
of the forms to effect change by themselves and more aware -
ness of the functional role these borrowed institutions were to
play in transforming Thai society.
The Legislative Council, it was announced in a
royal edict of January 10, 1895, was to supersede the old
advisory councils of 1874. 14 PKPS 213. Laws passed under
the former bodies, however, were to remain in effect.
(Clause 12), The membership of the new Council would consist
of two separate groups: all of the ministers in the newly
reorganized government bureaucracy, and twelve other men to
be selected by the king. (Clause 1). The Council was to
remain in existence at the discretion of the king. (Clause 1).
All members were required to swear a simple oath of office
pledging to perform their duties with honesty and integrity.
(Clause 4).
The chief officers of the Legislative Council were
the Chairman, Vice- Chairman, and Secretary, appointed on
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a permanent basis by the king. (Clause 2). The Chairman or
Vice-Chairman would preside over all meetings (Clause 8,
Paragraph 1), but if both the Chairman and Vice-Chairman
were absent, then the senior minister would preside in their
place. (Clause 8, Paragraph 2). If no minister were present,
then the senior Council member would preside. (Clause 8,
Paragraph 2). All meetings were to be held in the Palace and
were to be convened at least once a week. (Clause 8, Para-
graphs 5,6). Voting would be determined by a simple majority,
with the presiding officer empowered to cast the tie-breaking
vote. (Clause 8, Paragraph 8). No vote would be considered
valid unless one-half of the Council members were present.
(Clause 8, Paragraph 9).
This last rule was modified twice in the next five
years, however, apparently because the business of the Council
was delayed by the absences of members who were over-
burdened with other duties, and by members too old or sick to
participate regularly. A royal edict of January 5, 1896
declared that in the determination of a quorum of one-half the
membership, two groups should not be counted: (a) members
absent from the capital on business in the provinces;
(b) members who, for reasons of age or health, were unable
to attend meetings regularly and were therefore to be
designated "Special rathamontri.Tf It was emphasized that
both of these groups would retain their full rights as
ratthamontri in atiy meeting which they were able to attend.
15 PKPS 70. A royal edict of June 8, 1899 changed the
quorum requirement from one-half to one-fourth, while
preserving the two exceptions established by the 1896
amendment. 17 PKPS 48.
The topics which could be discussed by the Legis-
lative Council were limited to some extent by the wishes of the
king. It was generally forbidden to discuss any matter which
the king thought inappropriate, and his wishes were made known
to the Council either by direct order or by a communication
transmitted through one of the ministers. It was also possible
for a member to raise a topic for discussion on his own
initiative, if his motion were seconded by three other members.
(Clause 6). In general, it was necessary to adhere to the
prepared agenda unless the Council voted by three-fourths of
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the members in attendance to change the order of discussion or
to add a new item. (Clause 8, Paragraph 7).
The Legislative Council had the power to discuss,
debate, and reach agreement upon new laws and commands
which would promote peace, orderf and good government. The
king reserved the right to impose further restrictions or
exceptions upon the Council's lawmaking power in the future.
(Clause 5). In addition, before any act could become law the
approval of the king was necessary in each instance, with a
limited exception for emergency situations. (Clause 7).
Finally, the Legislative Council was empowered to establish
special committees to consider and report to the Council on
important problems. (Clause 9).
In a speech delivered at the opening of the new
Legislative Council on January 24, 1895, King Chulalongkorn
explained his purposes in establishing the new legislative body.
14 PKPS 336. Primarily the king intended that the Council
assist him in a complete revision of the civil and criminal law,
and all other laws as well. The Council was to help him decide
the propriety of all such measures and to weigh their efficacy
in promoting the welfare, happiness, and satisfaction of the
people. The king wanted not only to protect the individual and
his property, but to increase the level of fairness, judicial
certainty and equality, and the speed and justice with which the
courts disposed of cases.
Again the king cautioned his subordinates to follow
a policy of gradualism in their approach to reform, rather than
adopting unselectively the customs of other lands. Although
change was both necessary and inevitable, the king emphasized
that certain ancient traditions must not be destroyed, for they
lay at the very core of the Thai spirit and the beliefs of the Thai
people. Although the king offered no examples of the kinds of
traditions he wished to preserve, his observations are
reminiscent of his argument in the Speech Explaining the
Governmental Reforms that the kingship itself should not be
replaced by a parliamentary system. The relationship between
the people and the king, he had asserted in the earlier speech,
was too fundamental to the Thai tradition to be tampered with,
and the people could not tolerate its alteration or destruction.
46
In his speech to the Legislative Council, the king
alluded to the failure of the old Council of State and remarked
upon his need for legislative assistance in the work that lay
ahead. The king's executive responsibilities had been success-
fully delegated to his ministers, his commissioners and
provincial governors. His judicial responsibilities had been
carried out with the assistance of the various officers of the
judiciary. His legislative responsibilities, however, had not
been delegated to anyone since the days of the Council of State,
and as a result they had gone largely unperformed. It was the
king's intention, therefore, to establish the Legislative Council
as a permanent body which would, as the king's designated
agent, perform the legislative function of the Thai monarch.
Even if the king were travelling outside the kingdom 9 or were ill
and unable to work, the Legislative Council would be able to
function without any interruption.
It is this last point which raises an important
question as to the powers of the Legislative Council. This
question concerns the capacity of the Council not only to
discuss, draft, and approve legislation, but to enact it as law.
In his speech, King Chulalongkorn employed an ambiguous
phrase to describe the power of the Council to promulgate laws
in the king's absence, a phrase which may be translated
roughly as, "Bills which have been consulted and agreed upon
may be enacted as laws." The ambiguity lies in the uncertainty
as to whether the consultation and agreement must involve the
king, or whether the Council itself could enact the bill without
his prior approval. This point was clarified in Clause 7 of the
royal edict establishing the Legislative Council. According to
its provisions, no bill could normally become law without the
king's approval. If the king were absent or incapacitated,
however, and there was need for swift enactment, a law would
become effective when it was proclaimed even without the prior
approval of the king. To this emergency power of the Council,
however, three important conditions were appended: (a) at
least half of the total membership of the Legislative Council
and three-quarters of the members present at the meeting
must have clearly agreed upon the law and the need for
emergency action; (b) the law could not conflict with the royal
power and dignity; it could not infringe upon the sovereignty or
integrity of the country; it could not violate or conflict with
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any foreign treaty; it could not give away land, money, or other
property; it could not abolish or establish any tax; (c) the
king had the power to repeal such laws at any time he wished.
It was clearly the intent of the king that the work
of the Legislative Council remain subject to his scrutiny and
his veto. Even when the king was absent, the ability of the
Council to promulgate laws without prior approval by the king
was sharply limited and subject to immediate review upon the
kingTs return to work. This body was not yet the parliament
envisioned by the eleven petitioners who asked in 1887 that the
king establish a constitutional monarchy. It was not a machine
which could function smoothly even in the absence of the king,
nor did it remove the king from his position of overwhelming
importance in the legislative function. The fact that the king was
still able to exercise almost total control over the legislative
process is evidenced by a list of the statutory powers which
the king retained in relation to the Legislative Council:
Legislative Council
1. The king had exclusive power to select members
of the Legislative Council. 14 PKPS 213 (Clause 1).
2. The king could dissolve-the Legislative Council
at any time, for it lasted only as long as he required its
assistance. (Clause 1).
3. All members were obliged to swear an oath of
office, pledging to perform their statutory duties with honesty
and integrity. (Clause 4).
4. The power of the Council to debate and agree
upon bills was subject to any restriction of scope which the king
might choose to impose upon the bodyrs lawmaking capacity.
(Clause 5).
5. The king could forbid the discussion of matters
he deemed inappropriate for Council consideration. A council
member could propose new topics for discussion if his
initiative was supported by three other members, but it must
be presumed that such an initiative would be forced to yield to
an explicit prohibition by the king. (Clause 6).
6. In their discussions, the members could not
48
depart from their predetermined agenda without an affirmative
vote of three-fourths of the members in attendance. (Clause
8? Paragraph 7).
7. Under normal conditions, no bill became
effective as law until (a) a writing by the king signified his
approval, (b) the royal seal was affixed, and (c) the law was
officially proclaimed. (Clause 7).
8. In an emergency such as the kingfs absence or
incapacity, the Legislative Council could enact measures into
law without his prior approval, but this power was subject to
the severe restrictions enumerated above, and to the
possibility of a later veto by the king upon his return. (Clause 7).
9. The minutes of all meetings were to be sent to
the king within fifteen days. (Clause 8, Paragraph 10).
10. The king had exclusive power to appoint the
Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, and the Secretary of the
Legislative Council. (Clause 2).
11. The presiding officer of the Legislative Council,
usually either the Chairman or Vice-Chairman selected by
the king, had the power to cast a tie-breaking vote if necessary.
(Clause 8, Paragraph 8).
12. Meetings of the Legislative Council were held
in the royal palace, close to the king's scrutiny and influence.
(Clause 8, Paragraph 5).
Because the king exercised such strict control
over the legislative process, it is instructive to search for
areas where the kingfs supervision might be less intense,
where more freedom might be given to institutions or people
outside his immediate influence to play a creative part in the
development of new law. Two such areas worthy of exam-
ination are the legislative powers of the provincial authorities
and of the government under the queen as regent during the
king's European travels. In both instances, necessity demanded
that the legislative function be delegated beyond the king's
direct control. Both examples represent the outer limits of
the king's willingness to see laws enacted without his prior
approval.
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2. Provincial Legislative Powers and
the Legislative Function During
the Regency
Under normal circumstances, the function of
local government was not to enact new laws but to enforce
statutes promulgated by the king. In the Law of Provincial
Administration enacted by King Chulalongkorn on May 20, 1897,
no independent legislative power was given to any official at
the village, tambon, or district level. 8 16 PKPS 22. The
role of the local officials at these lower levels was purely
executive and not legislative.
In the case of the monthon, howwer, the largest
administrative unit outside the capital, and its sub-unit the
muang, or province, a limited legislative power was granted
to the administrative officers. In an order issued by the
Ministry of Justice on August 29, 1900, the ordinary and the
emergency legislative powers of the Chief Commissioner
(khaa luang yai) and the Commissioner of Justice (khaa luang
yutitham) for the Northwest monthon were elaborated. The
monthon administrators were permitted, under normal
circumstances, to draft legislation when both the Chief
Commissioner and the Commissioner of Justice concurred as
to its necessity and propriety. Such legislation was then to be
sent to Bangkok, and with the kingrs approval it became law.
In emergencies, when both the Chief Commissioner and the
Commissioner of Justice agreed that exceptional circumstances
required immediate action, then they could enact laws without
the kingTs prior approval. This emergency power was,
however, limited by the following restrictions: (a) the law
was still to be sent to the king for post facto approval within
six months from the date of enactment; (b) such laws could not
impose a penalty in excess of 200 baht or six months imprison-
ment; (c) such laws could not conflict with the royal power or
with any foreign treaty.
Officials at the muang level in the Northwest monthon
were also given a limited power to legislate. When such officials
agreed together upon the necessity for some law, presumably a
criminal prohibition of some type, they were empowered to
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enact it if the penalty did not exceed 100 baht or three months
imprisonment. Such laws, however, could not conflict with
any law of the central government nor with any treaty. A law
enacted by miiang officials would not become effective until
approved by both the Chief Commissioner and the Commissioner
of Justice in the Northwest monthon, and all such laws were to
be sent to Bangkok for the kingfs approval within six months.
17 PKPS 452.
A similar power to enact laws under ordinary and
emergency conditions was granted to the monthon of Phuket
in a proclamation signed by the Minister of the Interior on
February 8, 1905. 19 PKPS 359. It may therefore be
assumed that such a delegation of legislative powers was not
unusual during King Chulalongkornfs reign. Indeed, in neither
of the instances described here did the king consider the dele-
gation of such legislative power worthy even of his personal
signature, for both enactments were issued at the ministerial
level. It should be stressed, too, that the Chief Commissioner,
the Commissioner of Justice, and the miiang governor were all
appointed by the central administration in Bangkok and were
considered agents of the central government working in the
provinces, rather than representatives of the local population.
In the far South a slightly different situation
prevailed. The semi-autonomous Muslim areas at the turn
of the century were only gradually being assimilated into the
central legal framework. For this reason, an order issued
by Prince Damrong of the Ministry of the Interior on December
10, 1901 gave a special legislative authority to the old Muslim
princes, now transformed into miiang governors. 18 PKPS 197.
Under this order, the administrative unit in each muang,
composed of the governor, the assistant governor, the yokkrabat,
and an assistant administrator, was specifically permitted to
enact laws and administrative orders which they considered
necessary and appropriate. Such laws could not, however,
infringe upon the royal power, nor conflict with any existing
law of the central Thai government or with any treaty. It was
required, moreover, that all laws so enacted meet with the
approval of a Commissioner specially appointed for the seven
Muslim provinces. (Paragraphs 2 and 4). Under emergency
conditions, when immediate action was necessary, any member
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of the miiang administrative unit was empowered to issue a
provisional order. He was then required to inform the other
members, who could approve or disapprove the order in their
next meeting. (Paragraph 9).
To summarize, then, a limited legislative power
was permitted to exist at the miiang and monthon levels. It
was exercised, however, by officials of the central government
rather than representatives of the local populace, with the
notable exception of the Muslim officials in the far South.
Prior approval by the king was the rule, with a narrow excep-
tion granted in emergencies, when laws of limited scope could
be enacted immediately but were then to be sent to Bangkok
for approval. At the miiang level, minor laws could be
enacted with the approval of the monthon government and, later,
of the king. Again, the Muslim provinces were a significant
exception, and there the local legislative power appeared to be
more extensive.
Generally speaking, therefore, the legislative
power existing outside of Bangkok was permitted as an
administrative necessity. It was an acknowledgement by the
central government of the realities of distance and time and,
in the case of the Muslim provinces, of a strongly autonomous
body of local tradition. The delegation of legislative power to
the provinces was intended to maximize the effectiveness of
the central government's administration in those areas, and
was not intended to provide an opportunity for each locality to
exercise its own indigenous powers of legislative creativity.
The control of the king over all laws drafted in the provinces
was maintained to the utmost extent possible. Only to a very
slight degree, if at all, could the local legislative powers be
said to detract from the king's strong control over the
legislative function.
A second area of delegated legislative responsibility
was the government of the queen as regent during the king's
two European tours. The significant departure from normal
legislative procedure here lay in the fact that, in certain
instances, measures drafted by the Legislative Council could
be enacted into law without the king's prior approval. The king
himself expressed a strong desire that the business of government
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should be carried on as usual in his absence. He emphasized,
in a proclamation of March 14, 1897, that new legislation
which became necessary while he was in Europe should not be
delayed until his return, but should be proposed and enacted
immediately as it would be were the king still present. Although
he suggested that any official with a reform presently in mind
should inform the king before his departure, he also insisted
that matters which arose after he left should not be allowed to
accumulate, for then an unmanageable backlog of work would
confront him upon his return. 15 PKPS 261.
In a royal ordinance of March 21, 1897, King
Chulalongkorn provided for the functioning of the government
in his absence. 15 PKPS 251. Queen Saowapha was to serve
as regent, and five officials were appointed as her special
advisers. (Clauses 2, 3). Decisions of these advisers were
to be reached by a majority vote, with the Queen or the
presiding officer empowered to cast a tie-breaking vote.
(Clause 10). The legislative function was to be performed by
the Legislative Council as it had been in the past. The only
change was in the method by which laws were approved and
promulgated. This process was to be a joint responsibility of
the queen, her advisers, and the ministers, all of whom were
required to sign any law passed by the Council before it could
become effective. (Clause 17). There was a requirement that?
if any emergency arose which the queen was unable to handle,
an attempt should be made to contact the king in Europe.
(Clause 4). This provision could be interpreted as a restriction
upon major new legislative activity. In general, however, the
approval of the queen was to be considered binding like that of
the king, so long as no law infringed upon the royal power or
traditions, the sovereignty, security and unity of the country,
nor conflicted with any foreign treaty, and so long as such laws
were in each instance discussed with the advisers and signed
by the proper parties. (Clause 6). The fact that significant
legislation was indeed enacted during this period is evidenced
by laws such as a proclamation of June 21, 1897, enacted
under the regency and signed by the queen, which substantially
modified the structure and operation of the provincial courts.
16 PKPS 71.
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In the case of the regency government, as in that
of the provincial governments, the king yielded to the demands
of necessity and provided that the legislative function be
performed without his total supervision and control. In the
case of the regency, in particular, it should be noted that the
group which held the power to enact legislation into law was as
close to the king as possible: his own queen, a group of
advisers specially chosen by the king for this purpose, and
ministers appointed by the king himself. The time during
which the king delegated this responsibility was, moreover,
sharply limited, and provision was made for communication
with the king in the event that any emergency should arise.
In short, the government of the regency did not, any more than
the government in the provinces, represent a substantial
departure from the normal legislative pattern established by
King Chulalongkorn in the later years of his reign.
3. Comparisons with the Parliamentary
System
One commentator has observed that the Legislative
Council, after functioning actively for some ten years, appear-
ed to end its effective work in 1907, after which no meetings
are recorded. He speculates that the king chose to end the
Council's existence rather than see it remain as a permanent
body with a power potentially threatening to the legislative
prerogative of the king himself:
It is quite possible that when the great
press of new legislation was over in 1907,
the king allowed the council to wither
rather than risk the development of a
permanent institution to challenge the
royal will. 9
This interpretation conflicts with a view commonly advanced
that the Legislative Council was intended by the king as a
npre-Parliament," as a training for the Thai nation in
parliamentary procedure which would later come to fruition in
the form of a constitutional system. Indeed, the same
commentator observes elsewhere that whatever the king's
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intention, the Legislative Council served to "humanize the
throneTT and, by transforming the king into a mere "president
of the administration,tf began a process which was to end in
revolution against the absolute rule of King Chulalongkornfs
"less-commanding" successors. 10
It is interesting to speculate upon the questions of
royal motive and intent, and upon the changing image of the
king as legislator in the eyes of his subordinates and subjects.
Such speculation should not, however, lead to erroneous
depictions of the Legislative Council or of the earlier advisory
bodies as "pre-Parliaments" in the legal sense of the word.
In each case the king retained an insurmountable control over
the personnel, the procedures and functions, and the very
existence of the bodies in question. There is little justification
for asserting that the establishment of a constitutional govern-
ment in Thailand in 1932 represented a continuity from the
beginnings of parliamentarism under King Chulalongkorn. It
was, on the contrary, a sharp break from the traditional system
of king as legislator.
A few examples from the provisional constitution
of June 1932 will demonstrate the extent to which the revolution
reversed the traditional powers of king and legislators:
Provisional Constitution of 1932
1. Although the king remained the highest leader
of the country in whose name all government work was carried
out, he was only one of four organs of government represent-
ative of the supreme power of the people. The other three
governmental organs were the Parliament, the State Council
(a fifteen-man body selected by a Chairman who was himself
elected by the members of Parliament), and the Courts.
45 PKPS 131 (Clauses 1, 2, 3, 32, and 33).
2. No action of the king was valid under law unless
there also appeared the signature of some member of the State
Council with the approval of the Council as a whole. (Clause 7).
3. Parliament had the power to write royal acts
which became law with the signature of the king. If the king
should object to any law and refuse to sign it, the Parliament
could approve the law a second time at which point it would
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take effect despite the kingfs objection. (Clause 8).
4. It was the responsibility of Parliament, rather
than the king, to oversee the affairs of the country and to
dismiss any member of the State Council or the government
bureaucracy. (Clause 9).
5. The ministers were responsible to the State
Council rather than to the king and could not lawfully act in
contravention of any order or rule of the State Council nor any
provision of the Constitution. (Clause 31). Although the king
held the power to appoint and dismiss the ministers, he could
do so only with the advice of the State Council. (Clause 35).
6. Members of Parliament were not selected by
the king. Initially they were to be selected by the military
section of the ruling Peoplefs Party. Within six months, or
whenever conditions in the country returned to normal, the
Parliament would be composed of two groups of equal number.
The first group would be elected by the people, while the second
group would be appointed by the military section of the People?s
Party as before. When at least half of the countryTs population
had passed the elementary education test, or else within ten
years of the enactment of the Provisional Constitution, all
members of Parliament would be popularly elected. (Clause 10).
7. The king had no power to remove members of
Parliament, but this power could be exercised by the
Parliament itself when it judged that the presence of any member
was detrimental to the body as a whole. (Clause 16).
8. The making of treaties and the power of
declaring wars were powers of the king, but they could be
exercised only with the advice of the State Council. (Clauses
36, 37).
It is apparent from this list of examples drawn from
the Provisional Constitution of June 1932, that the legislative
function as established under King Chulalongkorn had been
totally inverted. Near-total control by the king over the
legislative body was replaced with near-total control by the
Parliament over the king. The power of the people was
theoretically supreme, and this power augmented the political
strength of the Parliament and its State Council rather than the
king.
King Chulalongkorn had greatly enlarged the
56
legislative function of the traditional monarchy under the rule
of the thammasat:
The king's traditional duty of adhering to
the Thammasat, or basic law, was sub-
verted byChulalpngkorn in his reforma-
tion of the structure and functions of the
Thai government. The Thai king was no
longer just an executor of traditional law;
he became a legislator with unlimited
powers to change Thai government and
Thai life.11
In expanding the legislative powers of the king, however,
King Chulalongkorn established no pattern of mutuality or
balanced power between executive and legislator for the
revolutionary government to follow. In this sense the
expanded legislative function under King Chulalongkorn
represented a consummation of the old order rather than a
prelude to the new.
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NOTES
1. During the regency period King Chulalongkorn had twice
travelled abroad. The first trip, in March of 1871,
took him to Singapore, Batavia, and Semarang. The
second trip, in December of the same year, included
among other places Singapore, Burma, and India.
2. The sakdina system was one of four systems, according
to Akin Rabibhadana, which were used to ffdistinguish
the power and dignity of the officials.tf The other
three systems were: ffthe yot (rank in form of title),
the ratchathinnam (honorific name), and the tamnaeng
(official position).T? p. 102. The sakdina system itself
is described by Ajaan Akin in the following terms:
The sakdina (dignity marks) system was a device
which served as the most accurate guide to the
different statuses of the whole population. Its
main function was to serve as a guide for behavior
in interactions. . . . (T)he amount of sakdina one
possessed correlated with the amount of manpower
under onefs control. The control of manpower
brought two assets which were wealth and political
power. . . . Thus the ranking system as shown in
the sakdina was based mainly on wealth and polit-
ical power, p. 98.
3. Wyatt, Politics of Reform . . . , p. 56.
4. See generally Professor Wyattfs account of this period
of political friction and crisis, Politics of Reform . . . ,
pp. 57-62.
5. In the kot monthianban section of the Law of the Three
Seals, two provisions illustrate the duty of the kingrs
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servants to obstruct or delay him when he sought to
pursue a wrongful course of action:
The first provision, 2 PKPS 128, required that any
person who disagreed with the king on any official
matter should express his dissent at least three times
in public audience. If the king was not persuaded,
then the dissenter was required to follow the king and
discuss the matter privately with him before acquiescing
to the royal will. Failure to follow the terms of this
provision was a violation of the law.
The second provision, 2 PKPS 129, stated that, if
the king should become angry with any person and call
for a weapon, it was forbidden for members of his
court to provide him with it. Violation of this rule
was punishable by death.
This analogy between the Law of the Three Seals
and the role of King Chulalongkornfs advisory councils
was pointed out by Ajaan Nidhi Aeusrivongse.
6. See Vella, Impact of the West. .. , p. 338.
7. King Chulalongkorn created a governmental Cabinet on
April 1, 1892. Since its functions were primarily
executive, it is not considered here as a participant in
the legislative function. See Wyatt, Politics of Reform
. . ., pp. 94-101.
8. The five units of provincial administration were, in
order of increasing size: (1) muu ban (village);
(2) tambon (comparable to a precinct); (3) amphoe
(district); (4) miiang (province); (5) monthon (region).
9. David A. Wilson, p. 197.
10. David A. Wilson, p. 103.
11. Vella, Impact of the West. . . , p. 349.
CHAPTER 3
THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION
A. Transformation of the Judiciary
There were several reasons why a restructuring of
the Thai judiciary lay at the heart of King Chulalongkornrs
plan of reforms. A primary consideration was Thailand's
foreign policy dilemma. In order to secure for herself an
unassailable position among the ffcivilized'f nations of the
world, free from the threat of invasion by the aggressive
western colonialists, Thailand had to transform the
administration and substance of her laws into a pattern
recognized and accepted by the great world powers. In this
way, too, the insult to Thai sovereignty represented by the
extraterritorial courts might be removed. A domestic
consideration was the kingfs desire to improve the well-being
of his people and to protect them from corrupt, wasteful and
arbitrary judicial practices. By restructuring the judiciary
the king could also increase his control over the countryTs
affairs, in the provinces as well as in Bangkok. Since the
waning of the patriarchal monarchy, the direct involvement
of the king in individual cases seems to have been partially
superseded by the Brahmin legal experts who were responsible
for interpreting the ancient law. 1 By reforming the judiciary,
the king would be able to assert his influence and imprint his
policies upon each level of the judicial process and thereby
extend the power of the central administration throughout the
country.
King Chulalongkornfs foreign advisers played an
important role in this regard, and the Belgian Adviser-General
Rolin-Jacquemyns, in particular, left an indelible mark upon
the judicial reforms of the period. It was he who urged upon
the king the importance of an effective local government and
judiciary in implementing the wishes of the people. He was
disturbed by the failure of local leaders to seize criminals or
to deal adequately with other problems which caused aggravation
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and hardship to the common people. He emphasized to the king
the frequency with which corruption among judges obstructed
the workings of justice, for bribes were commonly offered to
prevent the trial or punishment of criminal defendants. These
shortcomings created among the people a general distrust of
the Thai government which, according to Rolin-Jacquemyns,
made the country ripe for foreign intervention. 2 For reasons
such as these, the king came to believe that a reorganization
of the Thai judiciary was essential to the security of the
country, to his own political control, and to the well-being of
the people.
1. Historical Perspective
King Chulalongkorn inherited a judicial system the
chief characteristic of which was the division of responsibility.
Nearly thirty different courts were scattered among the
various ministries and departments, with overlapping juris-
diction and uncertain lines of authority and supervision. Since
the ministry heads were not legal experts, the courts were
isolated from any effective control over their functions. The
powers of these courts evolved largely without concern as to
the rationality of the system as a whole, and the result was
chaotic. The king himself found it difficult to trace the
tangled lines of judicial development and to explain the many
anomalies of jurisdiction and procedure which history and
accident had imbedded in the Thai court system. 3 it is not
difficult to imagine the despair of the average citizen when
forced to confront a judiciary so complex and potentially
threatening to his own well-being.
Responsibility was divided not only among the various
ministries and departments but within the very process of
adjudication itself. Although the trial was conducted by a judge,
or tralakan, the merits and justiciability of each case were
decided by a permanent body of officials known as the lukkhun
(or lukkhun na san luang). This unit, a separate department
in the traditional bureaucracy, was composed of a small group
of Brahmin legal specialists. 4 The lukkhun played a crucial
but limited role in the judicial procedure. They could interpret
the mysteries of the law but could neither administer nor
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execute it. They were consulted at several stages during the
litigation: upon receipt of the original suit at the department
for receiving plaints, upon the completion of a preliminary
hearing, and at the end of the presentation of evidence. Yet it
was the tralakan who presided at the trial and who delivered
the final verdict-- after the lukkhun had ruled on the merits
and after the official in charge of punishments had fixed a
suitable penalty for the losing party. ^ This cumbersome
procedure created numerous opportunities for delay and
exposed the litigant at each phase of the adjudicatory process
to the danger of improper influence.
Ironically, this bifurcated judicial system may itself
have resulted from the reform of an older system where the
lukkhun exercised total control over the entire legal process.
As hypothesized by King Chulalongkorn himself, this earlier
and more unified approach may have been abandoned during the
reign of King Trailok of Ayutthaya, because the lukkhufthad
lost their legal expertise and influence and were unable to
administer the judicial system efficiently. In creating his new
system of ministries and departments, King Trailok gave the
responsibility for supervising the courts and the trial process
to the various departments of the bureaucracy. He allowed the
lukkhun to retain the power to render verdicts only after the
trial had already been conducted elsewhere. ^
Another important feature of the traditional judicial
system was the absence of a clear distinction between civil
and criminal cases. Cases involving issues which, in other
legal systems, would be regarded as criminal matters, were
brought before the court by the injured party as plaintiff. His
remedy might consist not only of a money judgement or a return
of stolen property, but of the punishment of the defendant by the
local authorities. Civil and criminal elements were thus
combined in a single lawsuit. It was permissible, moreover,
for the plaintiff and defendant to reach a settlement without
going to trial in all "criminal" cases except those involving
certain offenses of unusual gravity. If the parties agreed not
to litigate such major offenses, then the head of the department
in which the trial took place was required to inform the king and
await his instructions or, if the case was tried in the provinces,
to seek similar orders from the provincial governor. • There
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was thus some assurance that the perpetrators of serious
crimes could not escape punishment merely because their
victim had been persuaded not to bring suit.
The administration of justice in the provinces, under
the traditional legal system, was apparently similar to that in
the capital. Each department with administrative responsibil-
ities in a given region also established courts to try cases
which fell within their jurisdiction. The role of the lukkhun,
however, seems for the most part to have been performed by
the provincial governor and the provincial council. After the
tralakan conducted the trial, the provincial governor and
council would render the verdict and pronounce sentence.
Appeals from provincial cases were handled at the local level
in most instances before any authority in the central government
could be approached. Errors of the tralakan could be raised
before the provincial governor and council. Errors of the
council could be reviewed by any member who did not
participate in the original decision. Appeals against the
governor himself went directly to the luang or royal court in
Bangkok, after the local court had been informed that such an
appeal was to be raised. In this process, the yekkrafaat acted
as a check on unfair or illegal behavior by the governor or his
council and reported independently to the king on such matters. ̂
In the provinces, the political power of the governor
was probably strong enough to influence the decisional process
in the local courts. The only recourse for a litigant adversely
affected by such influence was a lengthy and expensive appeal
to the distant Bangkok courts. In the provinces and in Bangkok,
the problems of delay and improper influence were multiplied
with each additional stage in the process of litigation. The
cumbersome and confusing judicial system, the expenses,
delays and personal dangers involved in litigation, the
traditional respect and fear of official authority were all
factors which might have discouraged local citizens from
seeking justice in the traditional courts of Thailand or from
daring to correct official abuses when they occurred.
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2. Structural Reorganization of the
Judiciary under King Chulalongkorn
a. The Early Period
King Chulalongkornfs first attempts to cure the
confusion and ineffectiveness of the judiciary were, like his
early experiments with new legislative bodies9 short-lived.
In 1874 he resorted to an instrument of royal control over the
judicial function known as the rap sang court, a temporary
court created by and accountable to the king for the resolution
of a particular case or group of cases. The rap sang court
was established by royal edict on July 14, 1874 to decide
cases pending in the four major ministries-- mahatthai,
kalahom, tha (khlang), and nakhpnban. 8 PKPS 162. This
court, which had been suggested by the Council of State, was
intended to alleviate the problem of increased crime throughout
the country, and to assist the nakhQnban ministry whose chief
was ill and whose work was not being completed. It is also
likely, however, that the rag sang court was intended as a
radical challenge to the traditional court system, with the
ultimate purpose of ending the delay, expense and corruption
which had become endemic in the courts of the major
ministries. ^
The edict establishing the rap sang court dealt
primarily with major crimes of violence, both in Bangkok and
the provinces. It required that all cases of any type then
pending trial at nakhtpnban be transferred to the rap sang
court. The court would then retain those suits involving major
offenses and redirect the petty offenses to an official in
nakh<?nban for speedy decision. The heads of mahatthai,
kalahom, and tha were ordered to do the same for all cases
then pending in their departments which had arisen in the
provinces and been sent on to Bangkok. In this way the rap
sang judges, who were directly accountable to the king, would
acquire jurisdiction over most of the important cases then
pending in the Bangkok courts and, at least in the case of
nakhpnban suits, would apparently retain such jurisdiction on
a semi-permanent basis.
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The fact that the king's motive went beyond mere
criminal punishment is evidenced by several provisions which
were aimed at the elimination of improper influence and
corruption in the judicial process. In Paragraph 5, for example,
it was made a punishable offense to coach the defendant
during the trial, to announce during the trial that the defendant
had friends in high positions, or to obstruct the process of
justice in any other way. Paragraph 7 required that the king
be informed of any instance in which a defendant or a witness
could not be brought before the trial court because he resided
in the royal palace, in the house of a senabpdi, or in the
residence of a prince or high government official. In all of
these situations there was a likelihood that the influence of
status and power might prevent the trial from taking place.
Paragraph 10 prohibited private communications between
litigants and judges in the rap sang court which might serve as
channels for bribery and corruption.
r aP sang court, not surprisingly, created resent-
ment among those who had long depended on the traditional
system for their livelihood. It was threatening not only
because it removed many cases from courts where jurisdiction
had previously been exercised, but also because it announced
new standards of behavior to be observed by judges and by
litigants. The edict was modified and weakened after the Front
Palace Incident of 1874-1875, during the same period when King
ChulalongkornTs early legislative reforms were to enter a
period of quiescence. ^
The king also attempted in three different ways to solve
the problem of appeals, linked as it was to difficulties of
political power and influence. His first step was to alter the
procedure for appeal in provincial cases where the governor
and provincial council had acted as the primary stage in the
reviewing process. In 1874 the king proclaimed that, in any
ministry or department which had its own court, the athibpdi
who was head of that department should hear all complaints
against the provincial council, the governor, the lukkhun, the
tralakan, and others. If the athibpdi should fail to render a
decision on the matter, then the case could go directly to the
king by petition, g PKPS 257. The king wanted the athibpdi
in each department to use his influence to ensure the speed and
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fairness of appeals which would otherwise pass through the
complexities of the provincial appellate system and the luang
court of appeals. This plan, as he later admitted, failed
because the athibpdi were reluctant to exercise their political
power in this manner. Instead, they usually evaded their
responsibilities by designating a new tralakan to hear the cases
and send them on to the lukkhun for a verdict. H The king was
unable to make use of the status and power of the athibpdi in
his efforts to expedite appeals from trial court errors and
abuses. The appellate process simply became slower and more
convoluted, with considerable confusion arising as to the
respective appellate functions of the athibgdi and the luang
appeals court.
During this same period the king appointed an official
known as the mae k grig, who was to examine sentences imposed
upon defendants before such sentences were reviewed by the
king himself. The king apparently intended that the mae kgng
would screen all cases which were to be presented for royal
review and thereby dispose of the litigation with greater speed
and efficiency. Instead, however, the mae kgng neglected to
review most of these cases because he lacked the political power
to do so. Litigants began to appeal to the mae kpng as a matter
of form merely to delay the final disposition of each case. If
the mae kpng ever managed to decide a case, his decision was
then appealed automatically for a second examination by the king
himself. Instead of expediting the review of cases at the high-
est level, the mae kpng merely delayed them further. In a
proclamation of 1885, the king recognized this difficulty and
abolished the office of mae kgng as an intermediate step in the
process of royal review. 10 PKPS 16; 10 PKPS 244. l 2
In a final attempt to establish a body with sufficient
power and status to decide the cases brought before it, the king
formed a dika court to assist him in deciding petitions for royal
review. This court was composed of relatives of the king who,
by reason of status and intimacy with the king himself, might
have been expected to wield the influence necessary to bring
order to the judicial system. Again, however, the king was
forced to admit failure. At that time it appeared that no one
except the king himself possessed the power to decide litigation
with an authority and finality respected even by the most
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influential parties. 13
In his Speech Explaining the Governmental Reforms the
king described in the most negative terms the situation then
existing in the Thai judiciary. Although the athibpdi were
given responsibility to ensure the efficient operation of the
courts under their control, they lacked the power to force
defendants and witnesses of high status to submit to the
court's jurisdiction. The tralakan, in consultation with the
lukkhun, were instead obliged to seek the aid of the police whom
the king had specifically empowered to assist the trial courts
in such matters. If, however, the courts were still unable to
proceed or to render verdicts because of other obstacles
which arose, then they were forced to come to the king himself
and request a royal command that the defendant appear before
the court and comply with the normal court procedures.
In short, the king complained, he was overburdened
with the day-to-day details of the judicial function to the extent
that he was unable to perform his other duties as king. At the
same time, he had failed in every attempt to delegate his
various judicial responsibilities to some other person or
institution, from the rap sang court, to the athibpdi of the
various departments, to the mae kpng for screening royal
petitions, to the dika court composed of his own relatives.
Each attempt to bring greater efficiency and honesty to the
judicial process had instead brought greater waste and delay.
The Thai judiciary, said the king, was like a merchant ship
which was fully loaded but rotten and decayed. Until the
present time, each hole had been plugged as it became apparent,
but the decay had continued and the cargo was increasingly
damaged. It was time, he concluded, to build a new vessel out
of stronger planks. 14
b. The Ministry of Justice and the Bangkok Courts
On March 25, 1892 King Chulalongkorn proclaimed the
establishment of a new Ministry of Justice and a streamlined
organization for the Bangkok courts. 13 PKPS 74. He was,
he announced, determined to end the delay and corruption which
resulted from the divided judicial responsibilities of the old
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system. His solution was to regroup all the Bangkok courts
under one minister who would oversee the judicial process,
resolve important problems which arose, and make certain
that the procedure was both convenient and just. The division
of responsiblity between the tralakan and lukkhun was also
changed. In charge of each of the new courts was an athibpdi,
or chief judge, whose role it was to decide the cases and to
supervise the trial process. Under him was a staff of examin-
ers who would actually conduct the trials. (Paragraph 4). The
practice of sending the case out of the court to a separate
lukkhun department for a verdict was thereby eliminated. Each
case was to be supervised from beginning to end by the athibpdi
of the court in which it was brought.
Seven courts were established under the proclamation
to replace the numerous courts which formerly existed in the
various ministries. The new courts were: (1) Royal Appeals
Court (performing the appellate function of the dika court),
(2) People's Appeals Court (replacing the mahatthai appeals
court), (3) Court for Punishable Offenses, (4) phaeng kasem
court (a civil court), (5) phaeng klang court (a civil court),
(6) sanphakpn court (a tax and inheritance court),
(7) International (extraterritorial) Courts. A department was
also established within the Ministry of Justice to receive all
plaints brought by the people. Its function was to channel the
suits into the appropriate courts and to prevent the parties
from exercising improper influence upon the athibpdi of the
court by bringing their pleadings directly to him. As time went
on, however, this department caused more problems than it
resolved. Many would-be litigants misunderstood its function
and believed that their suits had been disallowed because of
corruption within the judiciary, although in fact the department
had rejected the pleadings on technical grounds. When a later
effort of the king to clarify the work of the department had
failed, 13 PKPS 166, he finally abolished it entirely and
established new standards for receiving plaints in each court.
13 PKPS 178.
Other adjustments also proved necessary as the new
system was put to actual use. In the same edict in which the
king abolished the department to receive plaints, he also
abolished the Royal Appeals Court with an explanation that
68
there were not enough appeals brought by the people to justify
two separate appeals courts. This left only the People?s
Appeals Court as a body which would review trial court
decisions in Bangkok. From this court, appeals could be
taken by royal petition directly to the king. 13 PKPS 178
(Paragraph 1).
It was also found that the number of cases involving
punishable offenses was too great for a single court to handle.
For tfiis reason a new forum was created, the ratchathanphichet
court, which would decide half of the cases then pending before
the Court for Punishable Offenses, and would continue to share
the case load which would arise in the future. 13 PKPS 178
(Paragraph 2). On January 4, 1896, however, the
ratchathanphichet court was abolished. It was provided at the
same time that a similar court might later be revived if the
necessity should ever arise again. In the same proclamation
the two ncivilTT courts, the phaeng kasem court and the phaeng
klang court, were merged into one civil court. 15 PKPS 68
By 1896, then, the major courts in the Ministry of Justice
were: (1) People's Appeals Court, (2) Court for Punishable
Offenses, (3) nCivil?T Court, (4) sanphakpn court, (5) the
International Courts.
It is interesting to note as well the development from
1893 to 1896 of a "misdemeanors" court for the city of Bangkok.
^ e porisapha (also called polisapha) court was established by
royal edict on March 31, 1893. 13 PKPS 237. It was not until
nearly two years later, however, that this court came to be
used as an experimental model for several new judicial rules
and practices which were later to be employed in the major
courts of the entire country. In a proclamation of December
25, 1894 the king announced the establishment of three more
porisapha courts in the city of Bangkok. 14- PKPS 206. Each
of the four courts was to decide petty cases arising in its own
quadrant of the city, the precise geographical boundaries of
which were announced on February 26, 1895. 14 PKPS 292.
In the proclamation of December 25, 1894, there
appeared for the first time a precise statement of the way in
which a court acquired jurisdiction over a suit brought before
it. The court in each quadrant could assert jurisdiction over
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a case: (a) if the cause of action arose in that quadrant; (b) if
the defendant's domicile was located in that quadrant; or (c) if
that court had already decided another closely related case.
The proclamation also described the manner in which the judge
should announce his verdict to the parties. In particular it
required that the judge explain the reasons for his decision and
the law on which he had relied, together with specific findings
of fact. Other details of judicial procedure were also describ-
ed with a degree of precision not to be found in most laws of
that time. On August 11, 1895, one of the four porisapha
courts was abolished because there were not enough cases to
justify its continued existence. 15 PKPS 12. The role of the
porisapha courts as experimental models, however, was to
continue. On January 13, 1896 a new rule was proclaimed for
all courts in the Ministry of Justice. Trial court sentences
inflicting up to fifty lashes as punishment for violations of the
law were prohibited and were to be replaced by the imprison-
ment of the guilty party. This modification of the law, it was
announced, had first been tested in the porisapha courts where
it had proved a useful solution, at least in part, to the
troubling problem of corporal punishment. 15 PKPS 49.
c. The Ministry of Justice and the Provincial Courts
Until 1896 the Ministry of Justice exercised control
only over the Bangkok courts. No sweeping reform of the
provincial courts had been made when the Bangkok courts
were restructured from 1892 to 1896. Indeed, very few
changes of any kind had been made in the provincial court
system to that time. With the transformation of the traditional
bureaucracy, however, the control which the three great
ministries had exercised over their respective geographical
regions was eventually removed. As a consequence, the court
system which they had administered together with the provincial
governor and provincial council had also to be changed.
Mahatthai and nakhpnban were left with temporary authority
over the judiciary outside of the capital, but meaningful
centralized control would not be asserted until the provincial
courts underwent a restructuring similar to that of the Bangkok
courts from 1892 to 1896.
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On January 2, 1896 a new Law of the Provincial Courts
was promulgated which reorganized the workings of the entire
Thai judiciary at the provincial level/ and required cooperation
in its supervision among the ministries of Justice, nakhpnban,
and mahatthai. 15 PKPS 54. Three judicial levels were
established: (1) monthon courts, corresponding to the regional
administrative unit, would be administered by one athibpdi,
or chief judge, and at least two other judges. These officials
would conduct the trials and render verdicts; (2) miiang courts,
corresponding to the provincial administrative unit, would be
staffed in the same manner as the monthon courts; (3) khwaeng
courts, sub-units of the miiang, would be administered by only
one judge. (Clauses 4 and 7). In the region (monthon) of the
capital itself, only the miiang and khwaeng courts were to be
established, since the Royal Appeals Court already fulfilled the
function of a monthon court. (Clause 4).
Three classes of judges were created under the new
law, each with a different jurisdictional authority. The third
class judges were empowered to decide all punishable offenses
involving penalties up to one month imprisonment or a fifty
baht fine, and all civil cases involving amounts up to fifty baht.
(Clause 12). The jurisdiction of the second class judges was
limited to punishable offenses involving penalties of up to three
months, one hundred baht, or thirty strokes with a rattan
stick, and civil cases of up to one hundred baht. (Clause 13).
The first class judges had jurisdiction over punishable offenses
of six months, two hundred baht, or fifty strokes, and civil
cases involving up to two hundred baht. (Clause 14). The
jurisdiction of the khwaeng and miiang courts was then limited
to the jurisdictional authority of the judge who presided. In
addition, the miiang judges sitting en bane could hear cases
exceeding their individual jurisdictional powers: civil cases of
up to five thousand baht and criminal cases involving any
prison term, beating, or fine of five thousand baht or less.
(Clauses 16 and 17). Appeals from judgements of both the
khwaeng and miiang courts went to the monthon court, which
also exercised original jurisdiction over any violation of
statutory law. Appeals from the monthon court went directly to
the appellate courts of the capital. (Clause 20).
The chief judges, or athibpdi^were given a major role
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in the supervision of the provincial court system, but their
work could be subjected to the control of the provincial
administrators. The power of the athibpdi in the muang court,
for example, was limited by the approval of the highest official
in the muang. (Clause 21). In this way, the newly constituted
court system was prevented from becoming too powerful and
independent as a political force in the provinces.
The establishment and supervision of the new provincial
court system was an interesting study in the exercise of royal
power, both judicial and political. It was believed by the king
and by his Adviser-General, Rolin-Jacquemyns, that the
provincial judges and lawyers lacked the legal knowledge and
perhaps the political authority necessary to transform the
judiciary unassisted. For this reason, the king on September
21, 1896 established a group of Special Commissioners (khaa
luang phi set) and authorized them to reorganize the local
courts. 15 PKPS 144.*^ There were to be five Special
Commissioners in all. Three were permanent appointees, and
of those three at least one was usually a westerner. ^ An
additional Commissioner was to be chosen by the Minister of
the Interior from the locality in which the group was operating
at any given time; and the fifth member of the group was to be
the chief administrator of the monthon itself, the khaa luang
thesaphiban.
The Special Commissioners, under the authority of
the Ministers of Justice and the Interior, were to order and
ensure compliance with the Law of the Provincial Courts of
January 2, 1896. They were to report to the Minister of the
Interior alone, however, for at this time he still had primary
responsibility for the judiciary in the provinces. The Special
Commissioners were to visit courts, observe trials, check the
court records, test the judges' knowledge of the law, and
record their recommendations for improvement. They were
also empowered to conduct trials themselves, if necessary,
either as a group or singly. Decisions in such cases were not
to be appealed through the normal channels, but were to go
directly to the king. This particular function of the Special
Commissioners was expanded by a proclamation of December
12, 1896, 15 PKPS 277, in which two more Special Commis-
sioners were appointed by the king for the specpffita purpose
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of relieving the backlog of cases in each region where the
Commissioners worked. The two appointees, however, were
not given the general administrative powers of the original five.
Through the work of the Special Commissioners, one
monthon after another was added to the list of regions where
the Law of the Provincial Courts had been implemented.
Between June 1897 and November 1898, eleven monthon had
been incorporated into the centrally administered system.
On April 27, 1908 the Northeast monthon and the monthon of
Udorn were also brought under the supervision of the Special
Commissioners. 22 PKPS 159; 22 PKPS 160. In this way the
personal agents of the ministers of the Interior and of Justice,
with the authority of the king and the advice of foreign legal
experts, established a coherent and centralized judicial
structure throughout the country.
On April 5, 1908 King Chulalongkorn promulgated a
new Law of the Courts of Justice by which all courts except
the dika court of royal review were brought under the authority
of the Ministry of Justice. 22 PKPS 238.17 By this enactment
the powers and responsibilities of the Minister of Justice were
increased from a local to a nationwide scale, and the super-
vision of the Thai judiciary was finally removed from the con-
trol of any other agency or department not specially equipped
to deal with judicial matters. The enlarged scope of the Justice
Minister's responsibilities may be reflected in the fact that a
new Assistant to the Minister of Justice was soon established
in order to help with the added work load. .23 PKPS 32
(July 12, 1909).
The court structure established in the Law of the
Provincial Courts of January 2, 1896 was reaffirmed in the new
Law of the Courts of Justice of 1908, although the jurisdiction
of each of the courts was slightly increased and the classes of
provincial judges reduced from three to two. Judges of the
second class had jurisdiction over minor offenses with penalties
not exceeding one month imprisonment, two hundred baht or,
in the case of juveniles, beatings of twenty strokes, and over
civil cases involving two hundred baht or less. (Clause 22).
Judges of the first class could decide punishable offenses with
penalties not exceeding six months or one thousand baht
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and civil cases involving one thousand baht or less. (Clause 23).
The jurisdiction of the khwaeng and milang courts, as before,
was limited to the jurisdictional powers of the judge presiding,
but the mxiang court judges sitting en bane were empowered to
decide civil cases involving up to ten thousand baht and punish-
able offenses with penalties not exceeding ten years imprison-
ment, ten thousand baht, or beatings of thirty strokes. (Clauses
25 and 26).
nionthon court again was to exercise original
jurisdiction over any case involving a statutory infraction as
well as appeals from judgements of the khwaeng and milang
courts. (Clause 27). On December 11, 1909, however, the
king issued a proclamation stripping the monthon court of its
appellate function and of most of its judges as well. Whereas
the appellate function under the 1908 law had been shared by
the monthon court and the courts of the Special Commissioners
in Bangkok, now this function was given over entirely to the
latter (unless the Minister of Justice gave special permission
for the monthon court to hear the appeal). 23 PKPS 194.
Appeals from the judgements of the Special Commissioners
were to be sent directly by dika petition to the king. The
Appeals Court in Bangkok, which had formerly reviewed
decisions of the monthon court, was thus removed from the
provincial appellate process.
The 1908 Law of the Courts of Justice represented
the culmination of a long process of assimilation and reform
begun in the earliest years of King ChulalongkornTs reign.
All of Thailand7s courts except the dika court were now super-
vised by one minister who was directly accountable to the king.
By 1912, two years after the death of King Chulalongkorn, even
the dika court was brought under the authority of the Ministry
of Justice. The chaos and confusion of the old system was, at
least in theory, brought to an end, and the judicial structure
was reshaped in a manner which allowed it to administer
effectively the new laws and procedures which the king wished
to enact.
74
3. New Laws and Procedures for the
Thai Judiciary
Concurrent with King Chulalongkornfs restructuring
of the Thai court system was an equally thorough revision
and restatement of the procedures which the courts were to
follow. It is beyond the scope of this study to undertake an
analysis of all such changes in the civil and criminal laws and
procedures. As they affect the important issues of law and
kingship, they will be dealt with later in this chapter and in the
following chapter. A description of the reorganization of the
Thai judiciary would not be complete, however, without brief
mention of a few of the most important changes in procedural
and substantive law which accompanied the judicial reorgan-
ization.
Adjustments in the rules of evidence dated back to the
earliest days of King ChulalongkornTs reign. Later, on April
1, 1895, a royal edict set forth new and elaborate evidentiary
rules together with charts and tables showing which of the
traditional laws were eliminated or retained. 14 PKPS 225.
These rules were applied first in the Bangkok courts and then,
to an increasing extent, in the provincial courts which became
incorporated into the central system.
Civil procedure came to be controlled by a royal edict
of November 15, 1896, which proclaimed a set of provisional
rules to be followed until the committee in charge of revising
the laws had prepared a complete new code. 15 PKPS 15J. 18
This edict was followed by a proclamation on November 29,
1898 specifying the old laws which were replaced or amended
by its provisions. 16 PKPS 423. In 1908 the new code of civil
procedure was promulgated by royal edict, defining in elaborate
detail such matters as jurisdiction of the court over the
defendant, procedures to be followed in ordinary and in petty
cases, requirements and procedures for appeals, the role of
counsel, the appointment of special masters, offenses against
the status and power of the court, and the assessment of costs.
22 PKPS 254. With this new code, Thai civil procedure took on
an unprecedented degree of detail and precision, set forth in a
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form readily understandable to most western observers.
The law of punishable offenses underwent an analogous
revision and restatement. On April 27, 1896, a royal edict
established a provisional procedural law for all cases involving
punishments imposed by the government. 15 PKPS 106. This
procedure was to be followed until final codification was
completed. On June 1, 1908 the new code of substantive
"criminal" law was promulgated, containing significant
provisions dealing with such matters as crimes against the king
and the country, internal and external threats to the nation's
security, crimes against diplomats and foreign relations,
offenses against government officials, misuse of official
position, obstruction of justice, and crimes against religion.
22 PKPS"1.19 Certain of these provisions will be considered
later in this study.
In a preface to the new criminal code in 1908, the king
provided a fitting summary of his accomplishments in the area
of judicial reform. Since ancient times, the king observed,
the Thai monarch had defended and interpreted the thammasat
as the basis for the administration of all laws in the nation.
Whenever legal matters arose which could not be resolved
easily by reference to the thammasat or to Thai customs, then
the king would enact laws to deal with such issues. But with
the passage of time and the change of conditions, such laws had
proliferated and become confused and difficult to apply in the
courts of the land. When such situations arose it was customary
for the king, together with his advisers and the lukkhcm legal
experts, to revise and reform the laws.
The king had undertaken the present revision of the
law of punishable offenses for these very reasons. The last
revision of the laws had occurred more than a century before,
and in the interim they had become outmoded and self-contra-
dictory. In addition, the king pointed out, the unequal treaties
with the western countries had provided another incentive to
reform Thai law. Extraterritoriality required the application
of many different bodies of law within Thailand itself, and as a
result there was much uncertainty and confusion in dealings
with aliens. All countries like Thailand, which had agreed to
the establishment of extraterritorial courts, had subsequently
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desired to put an end to them and to make their own laws
applicable to all people within their boundaries.
For this reason, concluded the king, he had chosen
to follow the example of Japan, which was the first country
to solve this difficult problem. By commissioning foreign
legal experts to work together with local officials, Japan
had revised its legal system so that the laws would resemble
those of ihe western countries and would be administered in
modern courts of justice throughout the land. Foreign nations
had been willing to abolish their extraterritorial courts when
they saw that order had been brought to JapanTs judiciary.
Similarly, foreign legal experts had been brought by the king
into Thailand and a committee established to revise the Thai
laws. It was clearly the expectation of King Chulalongkorn
that this process of revision, together with the reorganization
of the Thai courts, would lead directly to the end of extra-
territoriality in Thailand and a recovery of her full rights of
sovereignty.
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B. Implications of the Change
King Chulalongkorn himself had described the Tahi
judiciary as & ratten and leaking ship and had set about the
task of building a new vessel to replace it. In his transforma-
tion of the judicial system, the king stated several different
reasons why this monumental undertaking was necessary,
reasons which have already been described and discussed.
Beyond the commonly articulated reasons and purposes of the
king, his advisers, and his ministers, however, the changes
in the judicial function brought other important modifications
to the traditional concepts of law and kingship. These changes
may be grouped into four different categories: (1) the
unification of the administration of justice and the extension of
control by the central government through its centralized
judiciary; (2) a growing distinction between civil and criminal
law and a clearer articulation of the role of the public
prosecutor; (3) a new theory of the role of the appellate courts
and an end to personal liability of the trial judge upon appeal;
(4) modification of the direct involvement of the king in the
judicial process.
1. Unification and Extension of the
Centralized Judiciary
The judicial system which King Chulalongkorn inher-
ited had been characterized by a two-fold division in the ad-
ministration of justice. A judiciary which may once have
been unified under the authority of the Brahmin legal advisers,
the lukkhun, had over the years been fragmented and scattered
among the various ministries and departments. The trial
process itself was divided between the judge who conducted the
trial and the lukkhun who rendered the substantive decisions.
In such a system it was impossible to assert any continuous or
meaningful form of central control. The king could not rely upon
the courts to enforce honest government, to combat crime and
disorder in the provinces, or to implement new policies and laws
which the government in Bangkok might choose to enact. The
system was too slow, too complex, too expensive, too suscep-
tible to the influence of money and political influence at its
various stages and levels. The average citizen probably saw
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the judicial system as a hazard and a threat to his life and
property, rather than as a forum for the vindication of his
rights or the enforcement of just government enactments.
The changes effected by King Chulalongkorn resulted in
a simplification and a unification of the Thai judiciary.
Ultimately, all courts were to fall under the authority of the
Minister of Justice who was responsible directly to the king.
The number of courts was greatly reduced and their juris -
dictional powers clearly articulated. The function of the
lukkhun was eliminated, and all judicial decisions were made
in the same forum which had heard the case. Not only the
structure, but the procedure of the Thai courts was clarified
and made applicable in the same manner throughout the entire
country. The king was able to control this newly centralized
system at all levels both through his Special Commissioners,
who acted as observers, teachers, and magistrates, and
through his Minister of Justice, who appointed judges in all
courts from the khwaeng level to the highest appellate court.
The only important exception to this general extension of the
central judicial power was the Muslim area in the far South.
Just as it had been granted a special degree of legislative
independence, so it was permitted to apply traditional Islamic
law, administered by Islamic judges, in cases involving family
law and inheritance which were governed by religious rules,
where the defendant alone or both the litigants were Islam.
18 PKPS 197 (Paragraph 32).
It is not certain that the average Thai citizen saw the
reformed judiciary under King Rama V as any less menacing
or complex than the old system. Nor is it clear that the
judiciary was administered with restraint and understanding
by the officers of the Ministry of Justice at all levels. It
cannot be doubted, however, that the king had succeeded in
creating an institution more responsive to his own wishes and
policies, and better equipped to implement his enactments and
to increase his capacity to rule throughout the country. In
this respect, the judicial power of the king reached a level
which had never before been attained by any of his predecessors.
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2. The Distinction between Civil and
Criminal Law
Under traditional Thai law, no clear line was drawn
between suits which many other legal systems would distinguish
as civil and criminal. Most lawsuits required the participation
of two private litigants and, with the exception of certain
particularly grave offenses, failure of the victim to come
forward as plaintiff meant that the perpetrator of a wrongful
act could escape punishment. 20 it is the opinion of one
commentator that the courts were used primarily for the
litigation of punishable offenses and that purely civil suits,
suits not involving the punishment of the defendant, were
rarely brought. 21 The legal reforms of King Chulalongkorn
not only sharpened the distinction between punishable and non-
punishable causes of action, but also defined with greater
precision the role which the prosecutor was to play in the
enforcement of the law.
Several statutes enacted under King Chulalongkorn
undertook to distinguish civil cases from those arising out of
behavior directly injurious to the state. In the provisional
civil procedure edict of 1896, 15 PKPS 157, civil cases were
defined as those in which no criminal punishment was requested
and the remedy sought was a money judgement. (Clause 4).
This description, however, was amended in a proclamation of
March 79 1900. 17 PKPS 197. The later definition included
both those cases in which no criminal punishment was request-
ed, and those in which criminal punishment was requested
together with other relief, where the criminal punishment was
not an nimportantTT matter under the law. No explanation of
the word "important" was offered. The 1900 definition of civil
cases significantly omitted the requirement that the case be
susceptible to settlement by a money judgement, and would
therefore appear to include suits requesting relief in the form
of mandatory decrees, such as court ordered injunctions and
orders of specific performance. The category of TTciviln suits
thus grew broad enough to cover all cases whose major aspects
were not criminal in nature.
In the criminal area, too, there were some changes
80
which suggested that the injured party was beginning to
play a role more closely akin to that of complainant, while
the prosecutor as representative of the state became the real
plaintiff. On July 18, 1903, for example, it was ordered that
no court costs should be assessed at trial whenever an injured
party alleged some punishable offense but requested no money
judgement. The financial burden of bringing such suits
apparently was to fall either on the state or on the defendant
but not upon the victim as plaintiff. 19 PKPS 38. In the
criminal code of 1908, 22 PKPS lf it was provided that the
plaintiff could file two suits against the defendant, one criminal
in nature requesting that a punishment be imposed, and the
other civil in nature requesting that the defendant make the
plaintiff whole. A civil suit might be brought, for example,
to regain possession of stolen property. If, however, the
plaintiff neglected to file any civil action, the court was
nevertheless obliged to return wrongfully acquired property
to its proper owner if he or she could be ascertained.
(Clauses 87-96). The criminal action would normally precede
the civil action. If it happened that the civil suit was brought
before the criminal suit then, under the civil procedure edict
of 1908, 22 PKPS 254, the civil action was to be suspended
whenever it appeared that the disposition of the related
criminal matter might affect the judgement of the civil court.
The judge in such cases was to order that the criminal matter
be resolved before litigation could proceed in the related
civil suit. (Clause 41).
As these distinctions between civil and criminal
litigation gradually developed, the role of the prosecutor also
became increasingly prominent. In the provisional law of
criminal procedure, enacted April 27, 1896, it was provided
that the state should act as plaintiff in certain criminal offenses
whenever the injured party did not appear in court to bring suit,
or whenever he should bring suit but fail for any reason to
pursue the litigation. Among the criminal offenses listed under
this provision were serious violations such as murder, rape,
larceny, and crimes against religion. 15 PKPS 106 (Clause 7).
As the role of the prosecutor in criminal trials was gradually
enlarged, so was his presence in all jurisdictions throughout
the country. In the 1896 Law of the Provincial Courts, it was
required that the provincial governor and the chief judge in
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each province appoint a prosecutor and a substitute prosecutor
respectively. 15 PKPS 54 (Clauses 25 and 26). In this way,
the prosecution of serious crimes throughout the country was
assured, even when the victim for one reason or another should
fail to bring suit.
The roles of the prosecutor and the police were
differentiated in a royal edict of April 1, 1897. Here it ^as
stated that the preparation of a case against a criminal
defendant was the work of the prosecutor and not the police.
The investigator's office of the nakhpnban ministry was
abolished and its work transferred to the prosecutorfs office
in the Ministry of Justice. The investigation, prosecution,
and punishment of the criminal offender were thus brought
together under the authority of the Justice Ministry. 16 PKPS
7. This edict was significant not only because it gave the
Ministry of Justice a new and important respoonsibility which
had formerly belonged to nakhpnban, but also because it
enabled the Ministry of Justice to implement more effectively
the policies of the central government in the suppression of
crime.
The final and most elaborate statement of the
prosecutor's function came in the Law of the Courts of Justice,
1908. Under this statute each court in the Ministry of Justice
was to be provided with a prosecutor acting as the government's
lawyer. The duties of the prosecutor in this capacity included
not only civil litigation in which the government was a party,
but all offenses punishable under law. The role of the
prosecutor was thus extended to include criminal suits in which
a plaintiff had already appeared to bring charges against the
defendant. In such cases it was evidently possible for the
prosecutor to join with the plaintiff in an action against the
criminal defendant. If the original plaintiff should drop out of
the suit for any reason, the prosecutor could proceed with the
litigation alone. 22 PKPS 238 (Clauses 33-35).
By 1908 the prosecutor's role had expanded to the
point where, in all courts under the Ministry of Justice, he
could initiate or join in any criminal action. Although the
injured party retained his or her traditional right to appear as
a plaintiff in such cases, the prosecutor could perform his
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function concurrently with the victim. By this means, the
central government was assured that its interests would be
represented in all courts throughout the country, and that
criminal actions would be vigorously prosecuted whenever
they came to the attention of the prosecutor. The overlapping
character of civil and criminal types of litigation would not,
therefore, impede the government in seeing its laws and
policies enforced in the courts of the Ministry of Justice.
3. Appeals
Under the traditional system of law which prevailed
before the reign of King Rama V, an appeal was, in effect,
a criminal suit directed by the losing party against the trial
judge or one of the witnesses. Because of the traditional
belief that justice sprang from the pervasive influence of
thamnm, the laws of moral truth, it was thought that the right-
ful party in a lawsuit would triumph unless the judge had
violated the law or a witness had perjured himself. Forthis
reason, the party who lost at the trial level, if he chose to
appeal, had to allege that either the judge or a witness had
broken the law and obstructed the workings of moral truth.
If the appellant succeeded in proving such allegations, then
the judge or witness was punished and the case was retried.
If the appellant failed, then he himself was punished because
he had improperly accused others of error when it was actually
he who was in the wrong. 22 The fear of losing the case on
appeal and subjecting oneself to punishment as a result, together
with the expense of the appeals process, discouraged most
litigants from seeking review of an adverse judgement. 23
This concept of the appellate function was fundamentally
changed during King Chulalongkornrs reign, and it is fitting
that Prince Phitchit Prichak<?n helped to institute the change.
Prince Phitchit, in his essay on justice, had emphasized the
relationship between justice in the courts of law and the rules
of thamma in the moral universe. This point of view accorded
well with the traditional concept of an appeal as a criminal
action directed against a judge or witness who had allegedly
violated the sacred law and had thereby wronged an innocent
83
party. As Minister of Justice, however, on November 18,
1894, Prince Phitchit issued an order which ended the liability
of the trial judge who was reversed on appeal. 14 PKPS 199.
Prior to that time the trial judge was commonly charged four
percent of the amount in controversy plus court costs if his
decision was reversed. Prince Phitchit ordered, however,
that the appellate court should no longer consider the trial
judge a party in the appeal nor should he be required to pay
anything upon reversal. The only exception to this rule arose
when the judge was accused of some illegal activity, such as
the acceptance of a bribe, in which case he did in fact appear
before the appellate court as a defendant.
Prince Phitchitrs justification for this change was a
practical one. He had observed that many trial judges
delayed the delivery of their verdicts because of their
fear that the losing party would appeal the decision and subject
them to liability in a higher court. This was one of the reasons
that the trial dockets were filled with cases awaiting decision.
Since nothing in the traditional law texts required that the trial
judge be considered a defendant on appeal, Prince Phitchit
felt that the older approach to appeals should be abandoned.
This practical justification, however, had profound theoretical
implications. Prince Phitchit had clearly moved away from a
concept of the courts as instruments for effectuating the
absolute rules of thamma, and had recognized that the workings
of the moral laws of nature and the written laws of man might
in reality be very different things.
With this fundamental change in the concept of the
appellate function, the rules regarding appeals took on a
greater sophistication. On December 11, 1895, a general
prohibition was imposed upon all interlocutory appeals. This
new rule, which had first been tested in the porisapha courts
of Bangkok, was found necessary to prevent the delays and
interruptions which resulted from appeals raised throughout
the trial process. Although interlocutory review of rulings
by the trial judge was forbidden, objections during the trial
were to be recorded and preserved for the appellate court
after a final verdict was rendered. 15 PKPS 24.
Another abuse was corrected on December 8, 1902,
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when the Minister of Justice ordered that the losing party at
trial be given fifteen days in which to decide whether or not to
appeal. The trial judge was thereby prevented from forcing
the losing party to indicate his intentions immediately after the
announcement of the verdict. Too many litigants, it was found,
had been bound in haste either to accept an unjust verdict or
else to wage a frivolous appeal. 18 PKPS 483. Finally, on
March 24, 1904, a royal edict placed strict limits on the
ability of any party to appeal his case beyond the first appellate
level. It was decreed that, unless two conditions were met,
no criminal or civil case could be appealed beyond the first
level if it involved a judgement not exceeding two chang (160
baht) and was affirmed by the first appeals court or modified
in only a minor way. The two conditions, intended to ensure
that only worthy appeals would be pursued, were (1) the trial
judge or the judge of the first appellate court had granted
permission for further appeal because the case presented an
important issue; or (2) a minister, a monthon commissioner,
the head of the prosecutor's department, or two attorneys,
had signed a statement that the appeal was in fact worthy of
further consideration. 19 PKPS 114.
These modifications of the appellate function suggest
fundamental changes in the concept of law and the function of
government in relation to the law. The government, as a
servant of the king, was no longer a mere custodian of the
sacred law nor an interpreter of absolute moral truths in the
trial courts of the land. If this were still the case, then it
would be entirely proper that the errors of the trial judge
should be punishable as violations of the sacred law. Instead,
the judiciary had become an organ for the interpretation of man-
made laws, not absolute moral truths, and in such interpreta-
tions honest men might reasonably differ. When disagreements
arose, they were to be handled in an orderly way, without
obstructing the procedures of the trial court and without expos-
ing the trial judge to the hazards of personal liability. Since
the losing party at trial was no longer deterred from appeals
by fear for his own personal safety, moreover, a new and more
rational screening process had to be devised. For this reason,
strict preconditions were imposed upon all appeals after an
initial and unsuccessful review at the first appellate level.
Both the trial courts and the appellate courts were thus enabled
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to function without obstruction and without a flood of frivolous
cases; and at the same time all litigants were assured of the
right to a meaningful review of the trial itself by at least one
appellate court.
4. Exercise of the Judicial Powers of
the King
Since the earliest days of the patriarchal monarchy
one of the primary judicial functions of the Thai king had
been the hearing of petitions from the people. The king was
an ultimate court of review, deciding appeals for clemency
and for other forms of personal intervention in all cases which
came to him by royal, or dika, appeal. With the reorganization
of the Thai judiciary under King Chulalongkorn, however, the
king's personal role in the appellate process grew more
sporadic and indirect. Although his power over the conduct of
the judiciary had increased greatly, his active participation in
its ordinary functions had become less intense.
In 1874 the king had required that the athibpdi in each
department screen those cases which would otherwise have
gone directly to the king on appeal. This was the first of many
attempts to diminish the number of cases brought for royal
review and to establish other bodies which would assist the
king in his appellate function. The old patriarchal custom of
personal review by the king still persisted, however, as may
be seen in a proclamation of 1884 which described the proper
procedure for forming lines at the palace door on specified days
of the month in order to present petitions to the king. 10 PKPS
140. The king's attempts to delegate his dika review function
-- to the various departmental athibpdi,to the mae kpng, to the
dika court composed of his own relatives -- had not achieved
any notable success during the early years of his reign. It
was apparent that the king could not entrust his traditional
power of ultimate review to any other group or individual until
the entire judicial system was reorganized. The practice of
dika review by the king could not be reformed and revitalized
without the assistance of a restructured court system with its
own appellate mechanism and filtering apparatus.
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A second form of personal intervention by the traditional
monarch in the Thai judicial process had been his supervision
of violent crimes and murders, and his power to impose the
death sentence on defendants found guilty of such crimes. King
Chulalongkorn stated that the officials of nakhpnban would
consult with the king before trying such cases, and frequently
the king would give them his personal authority to proceed and
to report directly to him. 24 The purpose of this practice was
to prevent other influences from obstructing the trial and
punishment of criminals who disrupted the peace and order of
the kingdom. Traditionally the king also reserved for himself
or for a specially designated agent the power to impose the
death sentence. This custom was apparently rooted in the
Buddhist reverence for life and an unwillingness to permit
anyone except the "Lord of Lifeft himself to order the death
even of a convicted murderer.
The monarches role in connection with violent crimes
gradually changed because of the judicial reforms enacted
under King Chulalongkorn. In the Law of the Provincial Courts
of 1896, it was required that the king's permission be
obtained before any of the three provincial courts could impose
a sentence involving either the death penalty or the confiscation
of the defendant's property as punishment for his misdeeds.
Only after the king's approval was obtained could such a
punishment be carried out. 15 PKPS 54 (Clause 19). This
rule was modified in the provisional procedural law for
punishable offenses enacted April 27, 1896. There it was
provided that the three most serious forms of punishment --
the death sentence, the confiscation of the defendant's property,
and life imprisonment-- must first be approved by the Appeals
Court. After such approval, the Minister of Justice was
required to present these cases to the king. 15 PKPS 106
(Clauses 38-39). The king thus added one more appellate
screen between the sentence of the trial court and his personal
review. At the same time, however, he increased the number
of cases in which a special review was required by including
sentences of life imprisonment with the original two categories
of capital punishment and confiscation of the defendant's property.
While describing the particular criminal sentences which
required special review, the king also made it clear that other
87
lesser forms of punishment could be imposed directly by the
local authorities. In a proclamation of October 21, 1896 the
king observed that many criminal cases had formerly been
submitted to him for determining the sentence appropriate to
a given crime. This was no longer necessary, announced the
king, for the Law of the Provincial Courts and the new civil
and criminal procedural laws now empowered the local courts
to impose sentences on defendants whom they had tried and
found guilty. By consulting the royal laws of punishments, the
provincial courts were to sentence the defendants themselves.
15 PKPS 232. By a proclamation of March 10, 1897, this
power was granted to the Bangkok courts as well. 15 PKPS 250.
Finally, in the Criminal Code of 1908, it was required
that the approval of the king be obtained before imposition of
the death penalty. 22 PKPS 1 (Clause 14). No mention was
made of obtaining the kingfs approval in cases involving life
imprisonment or the confiscation of the defendant's property,
and it may be inferred from this omission that such sentences
were now within the powers of the lower courts. The traditional
function of the king in supervising violent crimes throughout the
kingdom had been delegated by and large to the newly restruc-
tured court system and to the prosecutors in each of the courts.
Only the highest function of the traditional "Lord of Life" was
still exercised directly by the king himself in the imposition
of the death sentence.
In a similar manner, the role of th6 king in hearing
petitions for royal review was modified by the later reforms
of King Chulalongkorn. In the proclamation establishing a
Ministry of Justice in 1892 the king indicated that he would
no longer receive all petitions of the people indiscriminately.
Rather, the Royal Appeals Court was to decide all pending
dika cases, and in the future the king would hear only four types
of cases: (1) alleged errors of the Royal Appeals Court,
(2) alleged errors of the Peoplefs Appeals Court, (3) appeals
directed against the ministry heads, (4) other matters which
were worthy of the kingfs personal attention. 13 PKPS 74
(Paragraph 6).
The king also succeeded in establishing a body able to
assist him with those cases which did reach him on appeal.
83
The old and ineffective dika court was revitalized by the
creation of a new committee of five legal specialists, which
was to operate concurrently in the hearing of dika suits. This
committee, whose members included Prince Phitchit Prichak<?n
and the Belgian legal expert, R. J. Kirkpatrick, was to decide
dika cases independently of the older group. When the two
bodies arrived at different results, then the total number of
votes in both groups were to be added together to reach a
decision. 16 PKPS 374 (May 29, 1898). At last the king
seemed to have found a viable way to delegate to others the
power of ultimate review.
In the later years of King ChulalongkornTs reign,
further restrictions were imposed upon those cases which
could be submitted for dika review. On May 5, 1898, a royal
proclamation announced the types of civil and criminal suits
which were deemed appropriate. Generally cases could be
brought before the dika court if they involved judgements by
the lower courts in excess of two chang or six months imprison-
ment. No case which failed to meet these conditions could be
raised unless (1) the trial judge or appellate judge permitted
a dika appeal because he believed the matter to be of special
importance, or (2) any minister or monthon commissioner, the
head of the prosecutor's department, or any two attorneys,
attested to the propriety of a dika appeal in the particular
case. 16 PKPS 357. Five years later, on February 2, 1903,
the Minister of Justice took further steps to prevent time from
being wasted on cases unworthy of dika review. He ordered
that no court should permit a dika appeal for any case which
failed to meet the two chang or six month limitation. Litigants
in such cases were required personally to request permission
for a special exception from the dika court itself. 18 PKPS 543.
By a royal edict on March 24, 1904 the restrictions upon cases
qualifying for dika review were further tightened. No dika
appeal was permitted in civil or criminal cases where the
judgement did not exceed five chang and the appellate court
had affirmed the trial courtfs decision or made only minor
revisions, unless, as before, (1) the trial judge or appellate
judge believed the matter to be of special importance, or (2)
any minister or monthon commissioner, the head of the
prosecutor's department, or any two attorneys attested to the
propriety of a dika appeal in the particular case. 19 PKPS 114
(Clause 2).
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Finally, in the major enactments of 1908, the nature
and function of the dika appellate review were set forth with
clarity. In the Law of the Courts of Justice of 1908, a dika
court was formally established as the highest court of appeals.
It was to be presided over by a group of judges whose numbers
depended upon the wishes of the king, although a panel of three
judges was sufficient to hear and decide cases in the name of
the court. 22 PKPS 238 (Clause 6). • By retaining the power to
appoint additional judges at any time, the king could control
the composition and judicial philosophy of the court. Although
the statute formally delegated to the court the complete power
to decide dika appeals, it also provided that the court could
request the advice of the king before reaching its decision. By
this means, and by the king's power of appointment, it may be
surmised that the king retained some influence over the
decisions of the dika court, particularly in important lawsuits,
while divesting himself of the burdensome task of deciding all
dika appeals.
The Law of the Courts of Justice defined those cases
which could be appealed to the dika level as (1) appeals from
decisions of the Appeals Court, or (2) suits against ministry
officials relating to the performance of their official duties,
when such cases could not be brought in other courts.
(Clause 5). In the Civil Procedure edict of 1908 the juris-
diction of the dika court over civil suits was identical to that
in the earlier edict of March 24, 1904 (page
except that cases involving mandatory court decrees could
also be appealed to the dika court even where the minimum
jurisdictional amount of five chang (four hundred baht) was not
at stake. 22 PKPS 254 (Clause 144).
To summarize, then, the dika function of the king was
by 1908 delegated in its entirety to the dika court over which
the king nevertheless retained a significant influence in
important cases. The dika process itself was modified by
jurisdictional limitations upon the types of cases which could
be raised for appeal in the highest court. In these two ways,
the personal role of the patriarchal kings in hearing cases
brought before them by the people was replaced by a more
westernized and tfrationalizedff concept of appellate review.
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In addition, the king's traditional supervisory role in
cases involving violent crimes had been delegated entirely to
the courts, to the Minister of Justice, and to the prosecutorfs
office. The king retained only the power to impose the death
sentence upon persons convicted of capital crimes. As for the
suppression of outlaws and the preservation of peace and order
in the kingdom, the king had actually strengthened his powers
in this respect by delegating them to government officials in
the capital and in the provinces. By applying the newly revised
laws and procedures in the newly restructured court system,
these officials, in the name of the king, were able to exert an
unprecedented degree of control over the judicial function.
King Chulalongkorn, in his reformation of the Thai judiciary,
had vastly increased the traditional powers of the king to
implement new policies and laws in Bangkok and the provinces.
He had by this same process taken the first successful step
toward his primary foreign policy objective of treaty revision
and the abolition of the extraterritorial courts.
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CHAPTER 4
RIGHTS OF PRIVATE CITIZENS
It was perhaps a paradox that, as the Thai monarchy
reached its zenith of power under King Chulalongkorn, the
rights of private citizens also attained an unprecedented and
probably irreversible stage in their development. The king's
administrative powers could only be exercised by authorizing
other officials throughout the country to act in his name. This
delegation of responsibility took the form of royal enactments
which set forth the powers and duties of the officials under law,
both towards the king and towards the people. As a result,
the lawful behavior of government bureaucrats became less
arbitrary, less capricious, and, to a greater degree than ever
before, the people themselves acquired the power to hold these
men accountable for their actions. On a theoretical level at
least, a new set of legal rights began to develop. In most
cases these rights protected the people from unjust and arbitrary
conduct by the officials who wielded the king's new powers. But
also, to a limited extent, these rights touched on other areas
of great significance for the future: rights of speech and of
representation in the government itself.
A. Social Legislation
For the most part the social legislation of King
Chulalongkorn lies outside the scope of this study. The subject
should not, however, be passed over entirely without mention,
for it raises some important questions about the citizen's right
to equal protection under law. The legislation is significant
here because of its effect in breaking down traditional social
classifications and suggesting that the private citizen had
attained, regardless of class, certain common rights to fair
and equal treatment which were enforceable in the courts of
justice.
The Thai people had traditionally been divided into
four general classes: chao, khunnang, phrai, and that. The
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chao were royalty, persons closely related to the king. The
"declining descent rule" prevented this social classification
from being retained by one family indefinitely,for each
generation descended from the monarchy was assigned a lower
royal rank until the distinction was lost altogether by the sixth
generation. The khunnang were the nobility, so designated
by virtue of the number of sakdina, or dignity marks, assigned
to them, which in turn represented the number of men whose
services and manpower they could control. 2 The phrai were
the men who owed services, either to some leader known as a
munnai in the case of phrai som, or else to the king in the case
of the phrai luang. In return for the services of the phrai,
rendered on a yearly basis in a relationship regulated under
traditional laws, the munnai offered a form of paternalistic
protection to the phrai who served him. The fourth group, the
that, were slaves. They could assert most of the legal rights
of other citizens, but had chosen to sell their freedom under a
contract whose terms could, in most cases, be redeemed when
the original purchase price had been repaid. *
One commentator has observed that these four general
classes of citizens had undergone considerable change in the
first half of the nineteenth century. ^ Prior to that time the
princes had become powerful through the acquisition of more
phrai than their position strictly merited. Most of these phrai
were phrai luang who had escaped their obligations to the king
and attached themselves to a prince instead. In the early
nineteenth century, however, this situation was corrected by
marking all phrai with tatooes of theirmunnai. As the princes
subsequently lost power, the nobles gained power through
informal hierarchies based on new wealth brought into the
country through foreign trade. Their increased wealth and
status put them in a position to offer greater protection and
benefits to men who gave them their services than could the
traditional munnai, and in this way the old system began to
break down. The phrai became more and more oppressed,
finding it increasingly difficult to satisfy the demands of their
beleaguered munnai, who were themselves caught between
rising costs of living and diminished income. In addition, the
phrai were forced to channel much of their wealth into payments
to the new TTtax farmers'T who had bid for and obtained the
position of private tax collectors for the government with the
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right to keep as profit all income beyond the amount they had
bid. ^ it is understandable that many free men found it
enticing to sell themselves and their families as slaves, not
only for the purpose of acquiring money by the sale but because
the tax burdens on slaves were less oppressive.
The legislation of King Chulalongkorn brought profound
changes to all four classes of citizens. The royalty was
greatly strengthened not only by the enormous increase in
power of the king himself, but by his dependence upon his own
relatives whom he appointed as advisers, legislators,
ministers, and officials. The remaining three classes were
also affected during this period, by King Chulalongkorn's
abolition of slavery, by his restrictions on forced labor, by
the implementation of a more equitable tax system, and by
the enactment of universal conscription for the military. A
few important points are especially iwxrthy of mention here.
The abolition of slavery, like many of the other reforms,
was an exercise in gradualism. The king extended the process
of emancipation over a period of more than thirty years, partly
to avoid opposition from the nobility and upper classes who
might otherwise have resisted the change. The king also knew
of the Russian and American problems in bringing about
similar reforms and may have wished to minimize in Thailand
the social turmoil which those countries had experienced."
The king himself cited two more justifications for the gradualist
approach to emancipation when he first embarked on that course
in 1874. He contended that the abolition of slavery depended
not only on the promulgation of one great proclamation by the
king, but upon an elimination of the root cause of slavery:
namely, inequality in the payment of taxes. Slaves should not
be permitted to pay lower taxes nor to rely wholly upon their
masters for sustenance instead of holding regular jobs them-
selves. When this situation was rectified then the incentive
to become a slave would be removed, and the practice would
end of its own accord. In addition, the king looked to
compulsory primary education as a long-term means to bring
about the end of slavery. When children were well-educated
and could find work without difficulty, then they themselves
would not wish to become or remain slaves. ^
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King Chulalongkorn believed that slavery in Thailand,
although more voluntary and less oppressive than in other
countries, was nevertheless an obstacle to the attainment of
real progress and well-being. 20 PKPS 24. It is likely that he
was sensitive in this regard to the image of Thailand in the eyes
of the western countries. If the custom of slavery in Thailand
was regarded by them as backward or as a symbol of the
injustice of Thailand's laws, then it was essential for purposes
of national self-protection that the custom be abandoned no
matter how well-entrenched it had become. For these reasons,
among others, slavery was abolished in Thailand by stages.
In 1874 the scheme of costs for redeeming the children of
slaves was revised in such a way that any child who was then a
slave would be freed automatically by the age of twenty-one.
8 PKPS 280. In 1905 the king by royal edict decreed that all
children of slaves should be immediately freed (except in
certain Muslim provinces where local custom was to continue
in effect), that no one should henceforth be permitted to sell
himself into slavery, and that those who were presently slaves
should be permitted to redeem themselves at a lower monthly
rate of payment. 20.PKPS 24. In 1912, less than two years
after the death of King Chulalongkorn, the practice of slavery
was totally abolished by his successor.
Forced labor, once the backbone of the traditional
social structure, was also restricted severely and replaced
by a more equitable tax system and by a nationwide military
draft. To a certain degree, however, forced labor by men
and animals was still permitted in order to perform in the
provinces essential tasks related to the public interest. Such
tasks included the capture and transport of criminals and the
improvement of public works such as roads and waterways. It
was required by law, however, that when a public "taking" of
the labor and time of men and animals occurred, it should be
compensated according to a specific rate of payment published
by the king. The traditional prerogative of personal power,
the right to command the services of a number of men who were
the "clients" in a formal master-client hierarchy under ancient
law, was therefore challenged by a new legal concept. The new
concept required that such services be demanded only for the
benefit of the community or the state and that they be compen-
sated according to a scale of payments known to all. 17 PKPS
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528; 17 PKPS 542.
The military draft was first enacted by royal edict on
August 29, 1905, and was extended gradually to each of the
monthon throughout the country. It applied for the most part
to all men equally, rather than affecting only those phrai who
happened to be attached to a government department whose
functions were military in nature, as had previously been the
case. All men between the ages of eighteen and forty were
included in the sweep of the edict. (Clauses 4 and 5). The term
of service was seventeen years altogether: two years of active
service and fifteen years in two different types of reserve
duty. (Clause 7). Certain groups remained unaffected by the
draft, among them monks, college students, government
officials, Chinese immigrants and their children, forest and
hill tribes, and others. (Clauses 13 and 14). Although exemp-
tions were granted on various grounds of necessity, two
provisions in particular revealed the kingTs interest in
encouraging commerce and promoting lucrative sources of
government revenue: exemptions from the military draft were
extended to farmers who did a great deal of business and paid
a specified tax to the government, and to the heads of companies
which paid a certain amount in government revenues. (Clause
13). The edict as a whole suggested a new equality in the
obligation owed by each citizen under law. This egalitarian
theory was not, however, to override compelling interests
such as agriculture, commerce, and tax revenues for the
government. Also, a special status was granted in this scheme
to royalty and to the educated. Royalty, from the rank of mpm
chao upwards, were to be commissioned as officers or cadets.
Persons who had passed the higher education test were to act
as teachers in the military for a period of one year, at the end
of which time their military service was to end. 20 PKPS 302.
(Clause 15).
In a brief announcement of some significance, the king,
acting through the Minister of Justice, on January 14, 1906
gave the Thai judiciary a direct role in supervising the new
military draft. 20 PKPS 521. He ordered that disputes as to
who should be drafted or exempted should be decided by the
courts of the Ministry of Justice. Apparently the private
citizen had gained an enforceable right to fair treatment and to
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due process in his dealings with at least one administrative
agency. Not only were his obligations to the government
made less oppressive and distributed more fairly among the
population as a whole, but the entire administrative procedure
was now described by statute and reviewable in the courts of
the Ministry of Justice. While it is not clear that the system
actually functioned as it was set forth in the statute, the^
conceptual development alone is significant in so far as it
reveals a new legal relationship between the citizen and the
state. The demands of the state were to be reasonable and
necessary, they were to be distributed in the form of obliga-
tions owed equally by nearly all citizens, and they were to be
administered with fairness according to detailed rules which
the Thai judiciary was empowered to review and enforce.
B. Suits Against Government Officials
The role of the courts in overseeing the fairness of the
military draft was part of a tendency during the reign of King
Chulalongkorn to make government officials accountable to the
people. The Law of the Three Seals had also contained certain
restraints upon official misbehavior. In the laksana aya luang,
or Law of Offenses Against the Government, it was a punish-
able offense for any official to threaten injury to the people,
to persecute the people, or to behave in a corrupt or dis-
honest manner. 8 In the laksana aya ratsadpn, or Law of
Offenses Against the People, it was required, among other
provisions, that officials receive all suits brought by the
people, that they refrain from punishment or persecution of
individuals bringing suits, and that no one should beat or
imprison any person without justification. y
It is probably fair to assume, however, that few suits
based upon these laws had traditionally been brought against
government officials. The judicial process was full of un-
certainties and dangers and was subject at all stages to the
exercise of improper influence by the party against whom such
a suit might be brought. It has been observed that the munnai
was the normal channel through which the various complaints of
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the phrai were brought to the attention of the government, 10-
and it seems likely that most complaints about official mis-
behavior were handled in this informal and extra-judicial
manner.
It is by no means clear that the constraints of custom,
the traditional deference felt toward authority and the traditional
avoidance of the judiciary on the part of the people, were
eliminated by legal reforms enacted during the reign of King
Chulalongkorn. It is significant at least in the development of
legal theory, however, that the behavior of government
officials was increasingly subjected to rules and restrictions
imposed upon them by law and enforceable against them by the
public. Specific crimes and instances of official corruption
were listed in the Criminal Code of 1908. Among these, for
example, were the misappropriation of government funds, the
exploitation of official position to obtain profit, the acceptance
of bribes (with the penalty most severe in the case of judges),
and the misuse of official position to injure another party.
22 PKPS 1 (Clauses 129-146). Presumably such suits, like
other suits involving punishable offenses, could be brought
against the official either by the prosecutor or by the injured
party.
Certain important limitations were imposed upon the
peoplefs right to sue government officials for misbehavior in
office. By an edict promulgated April 29, 1901, courts were
forbidden to receive criminal suits brought by private citizens
against government officials on matters involving government
business unless certain preconditions were satisfied. It was
required that the complainant first present to the court evidence
which would be sufficient to prove the officials guilt. Only then
would notice be sent to the official and to the head of his govern-
ment office, but such notice would be a summons and not an
arrest warrant. Only if the official ignored the summons would
a warrant for his arrest be issued. 18 PKPS 22 (Clause 2);
18 PKPS 175. By placing these preconditions upon suits
involving government officials as defendants, it was apparently
the king's intention to screen out frivolous suits which might
interfere with the conduct of government business, even before
the official himself ever had any notice that his behavior in
office was under attack. The additional stipulation that a
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summons rather than an arrest warrant should be issued may
have resulted from a desire to protect government officials
from the stigma of a criminal suit until their guilt was deter-
mined in a court of law.
A further limitation upon suits against government
officials was imposed by an order of the Minister of Justice
issued May 17, 1903. 19 PKPS 20. This order announced
that permission of the king must be obtained before directing
any criminal suits against officials who had been appointed
by the king himself. Such officials, for example, might
include military officers, judges, or commissioners whom
the king had appointed for work in the provinces. Permission
of the king was not required, however, for criminal suits
against officials appointed by ministers or ministry
officers. This limitation meant that the special status of the
king's own agents, those men operating with his special
authority in the affairs of government, would not be challenged
by the people except in matters which the king himself deemed
truly weighty and deserving of punishment. It cannot be doubted
that the requirement of royal approval must have acted as
a substantial deterrent to suits against the king's appointees.
This was true not only because of the hesitation of the common
people in approaching the king directly, but also because the
rule emphasized the special relationship between such officials
and the king, making it appear that any reproach directed against
the officials was in some measure a reproach against the king
himself. For this reason, the rule served to cloak the officials
whom the king himself had appointed with a special status and an
aura of inviolability which few must have dared to challenge.
Government officials during the reign of King Chulalongkorn
were subject to greater and more detailed regulation of their
behavior in office than had previously been the case. In the newly
restructured judiciary, private citizens could more readily enforce
these regulations when official misconduct occurred. Certain
limitations still restricted the bringing of such suits, some
designed to prevent frivolous suits from obstructing normal
government work and some designed to protect the special status
of officials who were the king's "own men." In neither instance
were such suits prohibited; but it became necessary that an extra
step be taken, that an extra burden of proof be satisfied, or that
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the king's approval first be obtained. These restrictions were
important but did not necessarily prevent valid suits from being
brought, and their existence may in the long run be less
remarkable than the expanded opportunities which the people
had obtained to hold government officials accountable for their
behavior in office.
C. The Right to Fair Treatment by the
Judicial and Penal System
Probably the most dramatic gains in the rights of
private citizens came in their dealings with the judiciary.
The king himself, in his speech at the opening of the
Legislative Council in 1895, had announced certain standards
of judicial fair treatment which he wished to see enacted into
law. He desired that the individual and his property be
protected by laws which would apply in the same manner
throughout the country. He desired not only that such laws be
fair and merciful, but that they be clear and certain in their
terms so that no confusion could exist as to what was prohibited
and what was permitted. The king believed that the poor as
well as the rich should have access to the court system, and
that criminal defendants should be investigated and tried in a
fair manner without unnecessary delay. This speech, coming
on the eve of the most dramatic legal reforms of King Chula-
longkornTs reign, announced certain norms of fairness and
equality which would shape the legislation to be enacted during
the kingTs final fifteen years. 14 PKPS 336.
The goal of uniformity, of equal application of all laws
throughout the country, was pursued both in the geographical
sense and in the social sense. Geographically, the judicial
system was extended to nearly every region of the country and
the laws were to be applied uniformly by judges under the
centralized control of the Ministry of Justice. A notable
exception, of course, was the small Muslim area along the
southern border where an enclave of Islamic law still existed.
Socially, the laws were applied equally to all subjects regard-
less of status, with certain exceptions in the case of royalty
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and government officials. I 1 Social equality under law
represented a major change from the traditional legal theory.
The old system of punishment, for example, was theoretically
based on the sakdina of the parties involved. If a defendant with
kig*1 sakdina was found guilty under traditional law his punish-
ment was more severe than for a defendant of lesser social
status because he had failed to behave in a manner appropriate
to his position. If a defendant with low sakdina committed a
crime against a person of high status, his punishment was
increased according to the sakdina of his victim. ^ This
system was abandoned under King Chulalongkorn, and the
punishments specified under the new criminal laws were
applied in theory without regard to social rank.
The clarity and certainty of law desired by King
Chulalongkorn was attained in large measure by the
promulgation of extensive and detailed codes, both substantive
and procedural. To a degree never before seen in Thai legal
history, citizens were told precisely which acts were prohibited
by law and what legal defenses might be raised in various
criminal actions. They were told what sort of conduct would
constitute a cause of action for a civil suit. They were informed
in detail as to how a court might acquire jurisdiction over the
person or property of the defendant, and what types of cases
could be brought in the different courts. Judicial procedures
were set forth in detail, and the parties were warned as to which
actions would constitute contempt or an obstruction of justice.
The power of the court to render judgements was described in
detail, as was the right of the losing party to appeal those
judgements. In short, the king had effectively granted to the
people a right against arbitrary and capricious applications of
the law, against the taking of liberty or property without proper
notice as to the legal justification for such action by the state.
King Chulalongkorn had created a new legal standard requiring
that the law function in a predictable and foreseeable manner
in its regulation of the affairs of the people.
The right of the people to a fair trial was articulated
with some precision. In 1894 an extensive new law of evidence
and witnesses was enacted. In 1896 the Law of the Provincial
Courts clearly delineated the procedures to be followed in the
courts of the land and the powers which the various courts could
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lawfully exercise. The code of civil procedure, and the
provisional law of civil procedure before it, set forth the
rules for bringing suit, for Argument by the parties, and
for the rendering of a decision by the court, as well as
the proper method to follow for appeals. The Law of the
Courts of Jusice of 1908 provided a further explanation of
the manner in which all courts were expected to operate in
order to ensure a fair trial. The proper procedure to be
followed in trials for punishable offenses was set forth in
provisional form in 1896 and was later to be enacted as a
code of criminal procedure. In 1900 an important revision
of the rules of evidence permitted either party to testify
in his own behalf and to call his spouse, his children, or
his relatives as witnesses. 17 PKPS 195 (Clause 6).
The right of representation at trial by a qualified attorney
was guaranteed in the provisional law of punishable
offenses, 15 PKPS 106 (Section 9), and in the code of
civil procedure, 22 PKPS 254 (Section 17). Through
provisions such as these, a definition and a guarantee of
fair trial emerged to protect all citizens who came into
contact with the judicial system.
King Chulalongkorn had emphasized that criminal
defendants were entitled to a speedy trial without
unnecessary delay or detention. These rights were enacted
into law through a series of statutes. Under the provisional
law of punishable offenses of 1896, it was required that no
suspect be arrested without a warrant unless caught in the
commission of a crime or likely to escape before such a
warrant could be obtained. The warrant had to specify in
detail the crime of which there was reason to believe that
the suspect was guilty. 15 PKPS 106 (Clause 1). In the
Law of Provincial Administration of 1897, it was forbidden
to imprison any person without evidence. No imprisonment
was permitted, moreover, unless pursuant to a judicial
decision, a suit by some plaintiff, a court order, or some
cause to arrest the suspect. 16 PKPS 22 (Clause 45,
Paragraph 2).
These laws protecting against detention without
cause were supplemented by enactments providing for the
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speedy trial of the accused. In a proclamation of July,
1884, it was observed that many officials failed to send
criminal suspects quickly to the proper court for trial.
This was considered unfair not only to innocent persons
wrongly detained, but to guilty persons as well who were
forced to suffer the additional hardship of a lengthy
detention without trial. To correct this unfairness, it
was ordered that all officials attempt to expedite the
trial of criminal defendants and to avoid improper delay.
10 PKPS 172. Later, under the provisional law of punish-
able offenses, it was required that, after arresting a
criminal suspect, the investigation of his case should not
last more than forty-eight hours unless some written
explanation were submitted to justify the delay. In addition,
judges were required to hand down their verdict within
three days of the trial's end. The defendant, if found to be
innocent, must be released at once without further imprison-
ment or prosecution. 15 PKPS 106 (Clauses 3, 20, 37).
In addition to these safeguards against arrest and
imprisonment without cause and unnecessarily protracted
periods of detention, there was also an attempt to prevent
coerced confessions of guilt both before and during trial.
In a royal edict of March 1, 1897, it was observed that
the traditional practice of the police was to torture criminal
defendants in order to extract confessions of their guilt.
The trial judge under traditional law could order that the
defendant be tortured to obtain a confession whenever the
court possessed evidence of the defendant's guilt, and the
defendant refused voluntarily to confess his wrongdoing.
The edict of 1897 criticised this practice both because it
might unintentionally be used against an innocent person
and because the evidence produced by such coercive
methods was inherently unreliable. Since the new rules
of criminal procedure and the new rules of evidence and
witnesses already provided a fast and reliable means to
find the truth in criminal cases, it was no longer necessary
to resort to torture of the defendant. For this reason,
the practice was banned and made punishable under law.
15 PKPS 243. The right of the defendant against
involuntary self-incrimination during the trial itself was
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protected in a proclamation of February 19, 1900. 17 PKPS
195. This proclamation, which granted each of the parties
the right to testify in his own behalf or to call the opposing
party to testify, also provided that the plaintiff in a criminal
case could never call the defendant to testify. In this way
the criminal defendant was protected against the possibility
that he would be forced to incriminate himself through his
own testimony.
Another right associated with the trial process
to which some attention was given was the right of an
indigent party to a fair trial. In a proclamation of June
18, 1892, the right of poor people to bring suits in the
courts of the Ministry of Justice was guaranteed, and all
filing fees and court costs were to be waived in such
cases. The indigent plaintiff was required to pay the
court, however, if he obtained sufficient funds during the
course of the trial or as a result of the court's judgement
in the case. 13 PKPS 164. This proclamation was
apparently misused a great deal by persons pretending to
be indigents, however, and it was rescinded on March 29,
1893. At that time a new rule was enacted with a more
detailed procedure for determining the financial status of
the purportedly indigent plaintiff. Only after these
procedures were satisfied could the judge grant the
plaintiff's petition to waive all expenses. If, however,
the plaintiff should lose or abandon his suit, the court
was required to order full payment of the expenses which
had been waived on account of indigency. This curious
provision, which appears to squeeze blood from a stone,
was perhaps based on the assumption that the plaintiff's
family or relatives could be held liable for the payment
of these fees. Again it was provided that the plaintiff
be required to pay all costs in full if he should acquire
sufficient funds in the course of the trial or as the
result of a favorable verdict. 13 PKPS 172.
In the provisional law of civil procedure of 1896,
both plaintiffs and defendants who lacked funds were
permitted to argue their cases without payment of normal
court costs. An oath of indigency was required, and a
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penalty of six months imprisonment was to be imposed
upon the plaintiff, but apparently not the defendant, for
perjury in this regard. In all other respects, the law of
1893 appeared to remain intact. 15 PKPS 157 (Clauses
122-129). By a rule of the Ministry of Justice issued
January 23, 1903,however, compliance with the law on
indigent parties was strengthened by giving the defendant
an opportunity to disprove an assertion of indigency by the
plaintiff. His reward, should he succeed in proving that
the petition for indigent status was without merit, would
be an immediate dismissal of the entire suit. 18 PKPS
540. Provisions on indigent parties contained in the civil
procedure code of 1908 (Clauses 115-122) did not appear
to alter significantly the law existing at that time. 22
PKPS 254.
The concern for rights of impoverished parties
during trial was further evidence of a general attitude
that the judicial process should not be used in an abusive
or oppressive manner. A similar attitude led to the
enactment of laws dealing with matters which arose after
the verdict of the trial court. Appeals have been discussed
already in Chapter 3. They were now regarded as a matter
of right, at least at the first appellate level, and were no
longer treated as criminal suits against the trial judge.
The manner in which this right was to be exercised was
clearly described by the laws of civil and criminal proce-
dure. Criminal defendants after conviction were also
protected to some extent from the cruelty of corporal
punishment. Although corporal punishment was not aban -
doned altogether, it was in 1896 replaced with imprisonment
for those crimes which were previously punishable by
fifty lashes or less. 15 PKPS 49.
Some attention was also given to the last stage of
the criminal process, the Thai prison system. In a
remarkable order issued probably in 1899 (undated),
rules for the regulation and inspection of provincial prisons
were set forth. The rights even of convicted criminals
were to some extent defined and protected. The provincial
governor was required to inspect the prisons at least once
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every seven days, both during the daytime and at night.
(Paragraphs 2 and 3). He was required to do all in his
power to administer and improve the prisons. (Paragraph
5). He was ordered to meet with the prisoners and to
hear their complaints. (Paragraph 4). Inmates who were
addicted to drugs were to be treated by doctors and helped
to overcome their addiction. (Paragraph 36). Prison
officials were not allowed to beat inmates except to defend
themselves or others when attacked. (Paragraph 41).
Weapons were not to be used against the prisoners unless
they attacked prison officials by the use of greater force
or unless they attempted to escape. (Paragraph 42).
Regulations also controlled the work to be performed by
the inmates, clothing and other items which were to be
distributed, and punishments which might lawfully be
imposed for misbehavior by the inmates. It was required
that each new inmate be informed of all these regulations.
(Paragraph 83). 17 PKPS 148.
The order regarding provincial prisons is typical
of many of King Chulalongkornrs judicial enactments in its
broad scope, its particularity of detail, and its requirement
of fair treatment. To a degree never before achieved, the
rights of private citizens in their dealings with the judicial
and penal system were guaranteed under law. At each stage
in the trial process, as well as in pre-trial and post-trial
matters, standards of fairness were defined and made
enforceable against the officials involved. Whether or not
such standards were strictly observed and enforced at all
times, the conceptual foundations of the entire judicial
process had been radically altered. The judiciary was no
longer a powerful mechanism by which sacred laws were to
be applied arbitrarily to largely passive litigants. Instead
it had become an agency which, by means of detailed laws
and procedures, was to ascertain the truth and vindicate
the rights of the parties according to new standards of
fairness and propriety. By these standards the judges
were bound and could be held strictly accountable to
private citizens who had dealings with the judicial process.
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D. Rights of Speech
The protection of free speech remained throughout
the legal reforms of King Chulalongkorn an area of some
uncertainty. In Chapter 2 the rights of speech accorded
to the king's legislative advisers were described, and a
basic ambivalence in the attitude of the king was noted.
Although he permitted and even encouraged free speech
and criticism among his legislative councilors, he also
wished to retain substantial control over the matters
which they discussed. There was no public aspect to the
rights of speech guaranteed the kingTs legislative advisers.
They met privately and their primary function was to keep
the king, not the public, informed and to assist him in
drafting and evaluating new laws. In the area of public
speech by ordinary citizens, the issue became even more
problematic and the apparent ambivalence grew even more
pronounced.
In some instances the legal limits imposed upon
speech were strict and clear. Speech criticizing judges
in the performance of their duty, for example, was sharply
limited. In the provisional law of civil procedure, any
utterance which was directed against judges or against any
court during the performance of their functions and was
found to be improper, could be punished by as much as
twelve months imprisonment or a one thousand baht fine or
both. 15 PKPS 157 (Clause 140). A similar proscription
was contained in the later civil procedure code enacted
in 1908. 22 PKPS 254 (Clause 136).
In other areas, however, the problem was a good
deal more complex. A royal ordinance promulgated in
April 1899 dealt directly with the difficult questions
involved in the law of defamation. 17 PKPS 14. This
ordinance began with a historical perspective. In the
reign of King ChulalongkornTs predecessor, according to
the ordinance, it was unclear whether defamation was a
punishable offense or not. King Mongkut had maintained
that no legal action was necessary when injurious
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criticisms of the government or the people were published
because everyone would know that such publications were
false. If they were in fact true, then the speaker would
have had no reason to publish them. His natural course
of action would have been to bring such criticisms before
a court of law or before the king himself. The fact that
he had failed to do so indicated that his criticisms were
without foundation and would be regarded as such by all
who heard them. For this reason, according to King
Mongkut, it was unnecessary for the government to take
action against those who defamed it.
In the age of King Chulalongkorn, the ordinance
explained, private citizens had gained more freedom and
opportunity to disseminate views which were critical both
of the governments operations and of individual govern-
ment officials. While this was good in the sense that it
permitted honest, well-intended expressions of feelings,
it was bad in so far as it gave sanction to dishonest
purposes, to the intentional destruction of reputation,
and to deliberate attempts to obstruct progress in the
country. For this reason, a new law of defamation was
necessary, and the royal ordinance of 1899 set forth the
new rules which were to be observed.
The first prohibition involved speech which might
injure Thailand's relationship with foreign allies.
Defamatory utterances directed against the leaders of
foreign nations with whom Thailand had friendly relations
were punishable even, it appears, if such utterances
were truthful or not maliciously intended. If, however,
such speech was permitted under the law of the country
against which it was directed, then the Thai government
would also refrain from punishment. (Clause 4). This
exception was apparently abandoned in the criminal code
of 1908 which dealt with crimes against diplomatic
relations, and included provisions similar in all other
important respects to the defamation ordinance of 1899.
22 PKPS 1 (Clause 113).
A second area of proscribed speech involved
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criticism of the Thai government or king. It was generally
forbidden under the ordinance of 1899 to encourage people
to distrust the monarch, the existing methods of government
under law, the Legislative Council or the actions of the
judiciary; it was forbidden to encourage the people to
change the form of government by extra-legal means; and
it was forbidden to create animosity and dissent among the
people. All of these actions were punishable offenses
under law. It was possible, however, for a person accused
of such crimes to raise as a defense the fact that he
merely intended to point out a failure of the government
to perform its duties properly. In asserting such a
defense, the speaker had to show: (1) that he actually
believed that his proposed changes in the government's
method of operation would improve the existing situation;
(2) that he intended to persuade the people to accomplish
such changes by lawful means; and (3) that he intended
to point out a governmental practice which he believed
injurious in that it created animosities and dangerous
conditions, and that his intent in pointing out such a
practice was to change or abolish it. (Clause 5).
This legal defense to a charge of defamation was
extremely significant in its implications as to the
proper role of the people in seeking governmental reform.
It would appear to protect speech which was directed
toward such reform, so long as it was not maliciously
motivated and did not advocate violation of the law. The
defense was not provided in the provisions of the criminal
code of 1908 which dealt with speech directed against
members of the royal family and regents, however, and
was probably not available in such cases. 22 PKPS 1
(Clauses 98, 100).
The right of free speech thus remained a problem-
atic area under the laws of King Chulalongkorn?s era. Only
a year before the enactment of the royal ordinance on
defamatory speech in April of 1899, a western newspaper
publisher named J. J. LillylS had been deported from
Thailand for printing in his Bangkok newspaper and sending
to European publishers certain articles critical of the
Thai government. Mr. Lilly's error had been to imply in
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his writings that the government was unable to protect
the persons and property of foreign visitors to Thailand.
16 PKPS 157.
The king seemed to believe that a balance had to
be struck between utterances which could help to bring
about constructive reforms of governmental practices
and utterances which might endanger Thailand's relations
with other countries or the security of her own domestic
institutions. The distinction was a difficult one.
Thailand's laws and institutions were undergoing such
radical changes that it could not have been clear to
many people which ideas might lawfully be advocated and
which ideas were too threatening to the existing govern-
ment. A great deal of discretion thus remained in the
person of the king as to how strictly he wished to limit
public speech. The provisions of the royal ordinance of
1899 could have served as the basis for a great expansion
of the citizen's role in advocating governmental change,
for there was some indication that honest, well-intended
criticism was both necessary and desirable for the
effective administration of the country. But much would
depend on the wishes of the monarch himself. The
counter-interest of foreign relations and domestic security,
together with the inviolability of the monarchy itself,
could easily be asserted as necessary limitations on the
individual's rights of speech.
E. The Right to Representation in Government
Although the royal ordinance on defamatory speech
of 1899 implied that the people might exercise an
influential role in effecting governmental change, no
important political institution was created by which the
people could participate in the decisions of the central
government. Much of King Chulalongkorn's legislation
was enacted to improve the welfare of the people and to
abolish oppressive practices, but this legislation was
still created by unilateral royal mandate rather than
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popular consensus. The people still had no direct role
either in the enactment of laws or in the administration
of the country. Legislators were not chosen by the
public, but were appointed and controlled strictly by
the king. The distribution of power was far different
from what it would become after 1932, when the power of
the people was declared supreme and Parliament, which
was considered the primary representative of the popular
will, was given a dominant voice in the workings of the
government.
During the reign of King Chulalongkorn, however,
the law did give citizens the right to choose their own
representatives in the two levels of the provincial
administration which were closest to the people. The
phu yai ban, or village headman, was to be chosen by the
men and women of his village in an election administered
by the district chief and held either publicly or privately
as the people should desire. The duties of the phu yai ban
were generally to care for the welfare of the villagers,
to investigate suspicious occurrences, and to mobilize the
villagers for activities such as catching criminals or
putting out fires. 16 PKPS 22 (Clauses 9, 12 of the Law
of Provincial Administration, May 20, 1897).
The head of the tambon government, an adminis-
trative unit consisting of approximately ten villages, was
elected by a meeting of all phu yai ban in that tambon.
This official, the kamnan, was jointly responsible with all
the phu yai ban for protecting the laws and the peace and
welfare of the villagers. He transmitted complaints of
the villagers to the provincial government and from the
provincial and central government he transmitted laws to
the villagers. The kamnan had the power to call the phu
yai ban together for meetings and to initiate proceedings
against any phu yai ban or villager who should disobey
his orders. In addition, the kamnan7s duties were to
protect the order and harmony of the tambon, to assist
and inform the district government regarding criminal
matters arising in the tambon, to investigate suspicious
activities within the tambon, to aid in the collection of
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taxes, and to help officials of the central government who
travelled to his tambon. 16 PKPS 22 (Section 4).
The kamnan and the phu yai ban, chosen directly
or indirectly by the people, played an important role in
the administration of the day-to-day affairs of the villagers.
Their authority was, however, sharply limited by the
power of the district (amphoe) council, an appointed body
which supervised their work and could expel them from
office at least temporarily whenever they were found
guilty of misconduct. Beyond the district level, of course,
the power of the provincial and the regional governments,
all non-elective bodies, was quite strong and was represent-
ative of the king rather than of the local populace. Never-
theless, the right to exercise a voice in the selection of
the phu yai ban and the kamnan was an important one. The
power of the king had been extended downward towards the
people, and the power of the people had been extended
upward as far as the tambon level. At least in theory,
there was little room for the arbitrary and self-serving
behavior of entrenched officials who represented neither
the king nor the people. Moreover, the procedure of
holding elections at the local level made the practice a
familiar one to the people and could have served as
preparation for elections on a larger scale in the future.
In this sense the practice was significant not only for the
present role it gave the people in the local administration
of their own affairs, but for the future role it might
portend in the affairs of the central government. The right
to a representative government, once granted at the local
level, could more easily be extended to the regional and
national levels if future leaders should choose to embark
upon that political course.
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NOTES
1. Akin Rabibhadana, p. 99, points out that the
fifth and sixth ranks -- mpm ratchawong and mpm
luang -- were not, strictly speaking, considered
to be chao.
2. See Chapter 2, note 2.
3. Discussion of the four social groups appears in
Akin Rabibhadana, pp. 98-112.
4. Akin Rabibhadana, pp. 179-184.
5. The tax farming system is described in Walter
F. Vella, Siam Under Rama III, 1824-1851
(New York, 1957), p. 23.
6. These explanations are offered by Charern
Chaichana in Sangkom stiksa [ Social Studies ]
(Bangkok, 1959), excerpted in Chulalongkorn the
Great, Prachoom Chomchai, ed. and trans.
(Tokyo, 1965), p. 60.
7. Prachoom Chomchai, pp. 56-58.
8. Phra Wpraphakphibun, p. 106.
9. Phra Wpraphakphibun, p. 118.
10. Akin Rabibhadana, p. 84.
11. Restrictions placed upon lawsuits directed against
government officials and persons appointed by the
king are discussed at pp. above.
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Residents of the royal palace were also given
special treatment by the Thai judicial system.
On June 8, 1895 jurisdiction over such persons
was withdrawn from the courts of the Ministry
of Justice and granted instead to the Palace
Ministry by Royal Letter (phraratchahatlekha)
No. 6. Later, however, jurisdiction of the
Palace Ministry was restricted to cases in
which (1) the defendant was a person not allowed
outside the royal palace, or (2) the cause of
action arose in the palace. Thanin Krawichian,
Kan patirup robop kotmai . . ., p. 51.
12. Phra Wpraphakphibun, p. 137. Another instance
of different treatment for different social classes
under the old legal system is cited by Constance
M. Wilson. She notes that, during the reign of
King Mongkut, ordinary courts were deprived of
any jurisdiction whatsoever over royalty, resid-
ents of the Inner Palace, and certain persons of
high status. Cases involving such persons were
decided instead by a special court or by a
specially designated arbiter. Constance M. Wilson,
MState and Society. . . " pp. 408-409.
13. The spelling of Mr. Lilly's name, transliterated




The legal foundations of Thai kingship had under-
gone a profound shift during the reign of King Chulalongkorn.
Under traditional theory the Thai king had been the center
of the legal system. Sacred law, as embodied in the
thammasat, legitimated the kingTs rule, and the king in
turn legitimated the laws of the kingdom in his role as
protector and interpreter of the thammasat. The monarchy
was the center, the nucleus, the purpose of the govern-
ment itself. By the time of King ChulalongkornTs death in
1910, however, the traditional theories of royal legitimacy
had been irrevocably changed. New laws had seemingly
created new legal rights, and the relationship between the
government and the people appeared to have undergone a
remarkable transformation.
The development in the theory of law and kingship
was, however, uneven and at times inconsistent. In
certain areas the written laws grew and changed with great
speed. This was particularly true of the judicial function
generally and of individual rights in relation to the justice
system. In other areas there was little change, or else
the changes were ambivalent or even regressive from the
later constitutional viewpoint. The legislative function,
for example, remained the prerogative of the king alone
and he, with the assistance of his legislative councils,
exercised this prerogative in a unilateral and vigorous
manner. Rights of free speech and of representation in
government remained ambiguous at best, dependent upon
future political events for their development and
clarification.
The prevailing theory of law and kingship, because
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of its uneven rate of development, grew to contain certain
contradictions which were all but irreconcilable. A
broad spectrum of legal rights was granted to the people
of the kingdom, and yet the people were given no role in
enacting the legislation which created or modified such
rights. Governmental decrees were enacted for the
benefit and welfare of the people, and yet the entire
legislative process remained in the hands of a small elite
group. The people were given new remedies against
judges and government officials who failed to administer
the laws in a fair and proper way, and yet the people had
no voice in the selection of those persons who ruled over
them. Limitations were imposed upon the legitimate
exercise of power by government officials, and yet the
authority of the king remained absolute.
These conceptual contradictions may have had
little real significance during a time when change and
progress were already proceeding at an unprecedented
speed. The retention of vast political power by the king,
moreover, was surely welcomed by a public which held
King Chulalongkorn in the highest esteem and regarded
him as a uniquely wise and able ruler. As in the days of
the paternalistic monarchy, the power of the king promoted
and protected the welfare of the people rather than in-
fringing upon their interests.
The laws enacted under King Chulalongkorn are
not to be compared, however, with traditional legislation
enacted under previous paternalistic Thai kings. There
had occurred a fundamental change in the nature and the
effect of the new laws, and this change was to have a
profound significance in later years. The broad new
legal structure created by King Chulalongkorn was more
^ a n rachasat, or temporary royal law subject to complete
revision or nullification by succeeding monarchs in so far
as it was found to depart from the teachings of Manu.
Although these laws could in theory be taken away by the
same absolute power which granted them, it is nearly
impossible to imagine such a wholesale revocation
occurring in practice. Particularly in the area of
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individual rights a certain legitimacy arose from the survival of
these laws over time, from their continuing role in the courts
of justice, and from the prestige and authority of the king who
promulgated them. While they lacked the permanent quality
of constitutional guarantees, they became to a certain degree
inviolable in so far as they stated a new role for the private
citizen in the conceptual framework of law and kingship. They
were not mere rachasat in the traditional sense, whose existence
was dependent upon the approval of future monarchs, for they
represented a deeper and more fundamental change, a departure
from the thammasat itself as the legitimizing principle for
legislative enactments of the king.
Subsequent historical events proved that this was
indeed the case. Rama VI and Rama VII made no attempt to
nullify the body of law which King Chulalongkorn had created.
Yet they both failed to pursue the logic of the reforms which
had been enacted, to continue the developmental process which
their predecessor had set in motion. The internal contradictions
which may have seemed less important under King Chulalongkorn1 s
rule now loomed larger. Unable to justify their absolute power
by reference to the outmoded theory of traditional kingship, King
Rama VI and Rama VII were also unwilling to continue the
development of a coherent new system. They would not go
forward in promoting the newer theories of law and government
and they could not go backward in justifying their rule through
traditional claims of royal legitimacy which had begun to appear
unfair and outdated.
Certain concepts born in the reforms of King
Chulalongkorn were taken up by the.revolutionary movement
of 1932 to justify opposition to the absolute rule of King Rama VII.
A major point of dissatisfaction, for example, was the special
status of the royal princes under King Rama VII. They were seen
as a class above the laws and the jurisdictional authority of the
Thai judiciary. Only with the permission of the king could a suit
be brought against this group. The revolutionary leaders
believed that the special status of the princes created an unjust
system in which one class ruled over another class, the latter
having no legal remedy for misconduct or impropriety on the part
of their rulers. 1 This particular issue may be traced directly to
the legal reforms of King Chulalongkorn. His enactments had
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seemed to create a new guarantee that all officials could be held
accountable under law for their behavior in office. Moreover, the
king himself had promoted the notion of equality under law for all
persons regardless of social class. Nevertheless, King Chulalong-
korn had also sought to protect certain officials from direct legal
action without his consent, and had always insisted upon the
inviolability of the royal institution itself. This apparent
inconsistency, which was probably of little consequence during the
reign of King Chulalongkorn, became a major political issue under
his successors.
Similarly the area of free speech, which had remained
ambiguous under King Chulalongkorn, became a source of political
friction under the succeeding monarchs. Both Rama VI and Rama
VII attempted to censor the press when it published political
criticism by discontented Thai citizens or by foreigners residing
in Thailand. 2 This restriction of the right of free speech, although
clearly appropriate under the older theories of absolute rule,
must have appeared inconsistent with the newer guarantees of
individual rights under law. King Chulalongkorn himself had
desired that the public participate constructively in criticizing
and reforming the government. At the same time, however, he
had left open the possibility that speech too threatening to the
existing government would be punishable under law. Once again,
an ambiguity in the earlier period grew into a genuine political
issue in the later period when succeeding rulers failed to
acknowledge the force of the newer legal theories.
An announcement by the revolutionary People's Party
explained to the people of Thailand in 1932 why it had become
necessary to overthrow the monarchy:
When the present king [Rama VII] came
to the throne the people hoped that he would
give an equitable administration. Their
hopes were unfulfilled. The king was above
the law even as his predecessors had been.
His relatives and friends, even when without
ability, were given the highest government
positions. The king allowed government officials
to be dishonest. They took personal graft in
governmental building projects, in buying
supplies, and in the exchange of government
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money. The king elevated the royal class and
permitted them to oppress the common people.
The king ruled unwisely and allowed the country
to fall into decay, as the present depression
proves. The government of the king, who is
above all law, is unable to right these wrongs. 3
Traditionally there had been no doubt that the king was "above all
lawn in the sense that he alone could translate the precepts of the
thammasat into specific rules of conduct by which his subjects were
to be bound. The king himself was ruled only by the generalized
moral obligations listed in the thammasat as kingly virtues or as
principles of justice. By 1932, however, many believed that the
rule of law was superior to the power of kingship itself, that the
laws existed apart from the king and that the people possessed
certain rights which even the king could not disregard. This newer
theory of law and kingship, while owing much to the influence of
European political philosophy, may also be traced to the dramatic
expansion of individual rights under King Chulalongkorn, to the new
rules of judicial due process, and to the suggestion that all persons
should be governed equally by the laws of the kingdom.
This is not to say that the revolution was caused
directly by theoretical inconsistencies originating in the reforms
of King Chulalongkorn. Other factors, commonly cited by historians,
undoubtedly produced the revolution in the immediate sense. There
was, for example, the influence of European education upon the
movement's leaders, the effects of the economic depression, the
dismissal by King Rama VII of large numbers of salaried govern-
ment officials, and the demand of a growing educated class for a
role in the administration of the government. Many observers have
stressed the sometimes arbitrary behavior of King Rama VI and
King Rama VII, together with the latterTs lack of political experience.
It is often said that King Rama VII was unprepared for the task of
governing and was too dependent upon the advice of the royal princes,
who tended to promote their own interests over those of other
officials and of the public.
Moreover, the revolution itself should not be interpreted
as a broadly based movement of the Thai people attempting to secure
certain rights which they themselves had come to consider essential.
The revolution, like the reforms of King Chulalongkorn, was
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primarily a change from above, a transformation brought about by
a relatively small and elite group. Although its object may have
been the vindication of certain rights of the people, its beginnings
are not to be found in the public at large. The new theories of
individual rights under law had not yet become revolutionary
instruments in the hands of the Thai people generally.
In a broader sense, however, a causal chain may be
traced from the reforms of King Chulalongkorn to the revolution
of 1932. The transformation of laws and government by King
Chulalongkorn created a disequilibrium in the concept of
monarchical rule, an implicit set of contradictions with regard to
the king and his relationship to the law. Subsequent events changed
these conceptual inconsistencies into issues of real political dis-
content, issues which could no longer be confined within the bounds
of absolute kingship.
There was a strong inner logic to the new theories which
King Chulalongkorn had enacted into law. This logic demanded
that the theories not be accepted piecemeal. They could not exist
harmoniously with the older theories which they tended to displace.
The concepts of equality under law, of commonly-held individual
rights, of government for and - - to some extent --by the people,
once set in motion could not easily be contained. Inevitably the
newer theories tended to clash with the older theories, to create
crucial points of weakness in the conceptual framework of law and
kingship. In the later period of political strain and economic and
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